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The Puzzle of Judicial Education 
THE CASE OF CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM DE GREY 
Emily Kadens † 
Reading judicial memoirs from the last three centuries, 
one gets the impression that the judge took the oath, stepped 
onto the bench, and proceeded to fill the judicial role as if born 
in the robe. Even those who admit to having had a learning 
curve remain coy about what they did to teach themselves how 
to be judges.1 When asked directly, however, judges readily 
admit to the difficulties of learning their jobs.2 As one said, 
“[B]ecoming a federal judge is like being thrown into the water 
  
 † Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Law. J.D. University of 
Chicago; Ph.D. Princeton. The author thanks the following people for their assistance: 
Ross Davies, Richard Epstein, William Forbath, Mark Gergen, John Gordan III, 
Elizabeth Haluska-Rausch, Philip Hamburger, Michael Hoeflich, Guy Holborn and the 
staff of the Lincoln’s Inn Library, Dennis Hutchinson, Daniel Klerman, Stefanie 
Lindquist, Michael McNair, the staff of the Norfolk Record Office, James Oldham, the 
Honorable Lee Rosenthal, Renae Satterley, David Seipp, the Honorable Sam Sparks, 
Anthony Taussig, Jay Westbrook, and Ernie Young. 
 1 See, e.g., Kathryn H. Vratil, Notes from the Bench, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5-
10 (1993) (discussing her experience upon joining the bench without going into 
significant detail about her self-education). 
 2 See Robert Carp & Russell Wheeler, Sink or Swim: The Socialization of a 
Federal District Judge, 21 J. PUB. L. 359, 367-70 (1972). Other studies of judicial 
education include: Lenore Alpert, Burton M. Atkins & Robert C. Ziller, Becoming a 
Judge: The Transition from Advocate to Arbiter, 62 JUDICATURE 325, 329-30 (1979); 
Beverly Blair Cook, The Socialization of New Federal Judges: Impact on District Court 
Business, 1971 WASH. U. L.Q. 253, 253-57; Susan L. Goldberg, Judicial Socialization: 
An Empirical Study, 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 423, 426-31 (1985); J. Woodford Howard, Jr., 
Judge Harold R. Medina: The “Freshman” Years, 69 JUDICATURE 127, 127 (1985); On 
Becoming a Judge: Socialization to the Judicial Role, 69 JUDICATURE 139, 139 (1985) 
[hereinafter On Becoming a Judge] (interview with a panel of legal professionals about 
new judges and their effect on “American justice”); Thomas B. Russell, Bridging the 
Gap: Between a Trial Lawyer’s Experience and Becoming a Good Judge Is a Distance 
that Goes Beyond Ordinary Measurements, JUDGES J., Fall 1988, at 16, 56-57; Stephen 
L. Wasby, “Into the Soup?”: The Acclimation of Ninth Circuit Appellate Judges, 73 
JUDICATURE 10, 10-14 (1989); Paul Wice, Judicial Socialization: The Philadelphia 
Experience, in COURTS AND JUDGES 149, 149-71 (James A. Cramer ed., 1981). For a 
more general study of the “freshman effect” on opinion writing see Virginia A. 
Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Acclimation Effects and 
Separate Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 792, 792-93 
(2003) and the literature cited there. 
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and being told to swim.”3 Recognizing the need for formal 
training, in the last fifty years both the federal and state 
judiciaries have created what are affectionately known as baby 
judge schools, short orientation programs primarily aimed at 
instructing trial-level judges in law and judicial 
administration.4 
Fifty years is a very short time in the life of a problem 
that began at least as early as the sixteenth century, when the 
English started to turn to experienced lawyers with no judicial 
experience to staff their central common law courts.5 The 
United States inherited this system of selecting its judges from 
the general pool of lawyers, and thereby also inherited the 
dilemma of training those neophyte judges in their new roles.6 
Interestingly, however, despite evidence of the omnipresence of 
judges’ need for education and the likelihood that early modern 
judges were no more able to step seamlessly onto the bench 
than their modern counterparts, scholars and historians of the 
  
 3 Carp & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 374 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Alpert, Atkins & Ziller, supra note 2, at 330 (“It takes two or three years to get 
to where you finally feel sure of yourself.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); On 
Becoming a Judge, supra note 2, at 140 (“Every judge I’ve ever talked to said, ‘yes, 
there was a period in which I felt like a freshman.’”); Wasby, supra note 2, at 10 
(“When I joined the court . . . I was left to stumble, bumble, and do injustice to other 
people. I was given no manual, no orientation, [and] no one came forward to help.” 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 4 “Baby Judges School” Jump Starts Learning Process, THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 
2005, at 1, 10 (federal baby judges school); Larry Berkson & Lenore Haggard, The 
Education and Training of Judges in the United States, in MANAGING THE STATE 
COURTS 145-49 (Larry C. Berkson, Steven W. Hays & Susan J. Carbon eds., 1977) 
(detailing early history of state baby judges schools); Rex Bossert, A Week at Boot 
Camp for Judges: Rookie Jurists Get a Crash Course and Swap Court Tips at Baby 
Judge School, NAT’L L.J., Jul. 7, 1997, at A1 (federal baby judges school); Cook, supra 
note 2, at 263-66 (early history of federal baby judge seminars); see also Russell, supra 
note 2, at 17 (“Judicial education is a young science. It was only 25 years ago that the 
National Judicial College was founded by judges who recognized their need for 
professional judicial education.”). 
 5 The earliest English justiciars and justices, of course, had no judicial 
experience prior to taking the bench. However, as discussed below, between the 
fourteenth and sixteenth centuries judges were selected from among the serjeants-at-
law, leading lawyers who served a sort of judicial apprenticeship before taking the 
bench. See discussion infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
 6 See On Becoming a Judge, supra note 2, at 142 (“Federal judicial 
recruitment processes are almost tailor-made to pick people who don’t know an awful 
lot about what they’re supposed to do to become a judge. I think typically the judges 
are successful practitioners, which requires a certain degree of specialization, and they 
get on the federal bench anyway and they’re faced with all sorts of civil rights and 
constitutional law and criminal procedure questions about which they know relatively 
little.”). 
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judiciary have paid limited attention to the question of how an 
appointee learns to be a judge.7 
One reason for both the lack of scholarship and the need 
for judicial education may be the mystique of the judge, whom 
Blackstone called the “depositories of the law; the living 
oracles.”8 In civil law countries, the judiciary has long been 
viewed as a career, an honorable one, perhaps, but just one 
amongst many choices a young lawyer could make. The law 
student or law school graduate selects the judicial track, 
receives focused training, and progresses up the hierarchy of 
courts as his or her abilities, interests, and experience 
warrant.9 In such a system, the fact of judicial education is 
openly acknowledged. In common law countries, by contrast, a 
judgeship long ago became a reward for a successful career as a 
practitioner. It was not a career the young lawyer prepared for; 
it was, and remains, the plum he hoped he might earn by 
service in another branch of the law.10 This method of 
appointing top lawyers to the bench encourages a mentality 
that “the better the advocate, the better the judge is likely to 
be,”11 and discourages admitting, as Chief Justice Warren 
Burger did in an interview, that “not every person appointed is 
immediately qualified to step right in and perform the 
function.”12 
The mystique of common law judges presumed to have 
“learn[ed] their roles en route to office” also has consequences 
  
 7 See supra notes 2, 4 (literature on modern judicial education). 
 8 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69; see also JOHN P. DAWSON, 
THE ORACLES OF THE LAW, at xi (1968) (saying that Blackstone’s comment “could not 
have seemed at the time he wrote to be greatly exaggerated. The predominant role of 
English judges in the creation and development of English law had been written for all 
to see. To us in this country, some 200 years later, the influence of judges has if 
anything increased.”). 
 9 The key elements across civil law system are that judges are formally 
trained and that there are separate hierarchies for judges and lawyers. Systems vary 
in how they recruit and train their judges. For the variations in some European judicial 
training systems see JOHN BELL, JUDICIARIES WITHIN EUROPE 52-58 (France); id. at 
113-18, 120-24 (Germany); id. at 189-95 (Spain); id. at 244-46, 248-51 (Sweden); id. at 
312-13, 319-20 (England) (2007). 
 10 DANIEL DUMAN, THE JUDICIAL BENCH IN ENGLAND, 1727-1875: THE 
RESHAPING OF A PROFESSIONAL ELITE 72-99 (1982); DAVID LEMMINGS, PROFESSORS OF 
THE LAW: BARRISTERS AND ENGLISH LEGAL CULTURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
275-81 (2000) (reviewing pre-judicial career paths of English judges); WILFRID R. 
PREST, THE RISE OF THE BARRISTERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR, 1590-
1640, at 135 (1986) (“The highest prize within the legal profession itself was a judge’s 
place in one of the superior courts of Westminster Hall . . . .”). 
 11 Howard, supra note 2, at 127 (paraphrasing Charles Evans Hughes, Jr.). 
 12 Interview with Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Aug. 21, 1972, at 42. 
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for scholarship.13 If the myth were true, then a study of judicial 
education would be uninteresting, if it were even conceived of 
at all. And because the perpetuation of the myth is 
incompatible with judges discussing their methods of self-
training, evidence can be hard to come by.14 Thus it is hardly 
surprising that so little has been written about the specific 
steps new judges have taken to acquire the knowledge 
necessary to serve on the court to which they have been raised. 
But the myth is not true, and it has not been true for at 
least two centuries, as this study of the education of judges in 
eighteenth-century England, and specifically that of William de 
Grey (1719-1781), who served as Chief Justice of the Court of 
Common Pleas from 1771 to 1780, will try to demonstrate. This 
Article draws on an unusual and heretofore unexplored 
collection of archival material in Norwich, England and in 
Lincoln’s Inn, London to shed some light on the way one 
important and well-regarded judge addressed his knowledge 
gap.15 Although a work of legal history, it borrows from the 
discoveries of modern studies of judicial education to help give 
meaning to the historical evidence. And although as a work of 
history it claims to offer no lessons for the present, the story of 
how de Grey and his brethren learned their jobs does suggest 
the universality within the common law world of both the 
problem of judicial training and its solution. 
Current scholarship calls the process of learning to be a 
judge “socialization.” In these works, socialization is a broad 
  
 13 Howard, supra note 2, at 127; see also Edson L. Haines, Judicial 
Education, in HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES: AN ANTHOLOGY OF INSPIRATIONAL AND 
EDUCATIONAL WRITINGS FOR MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY 230, 231 (Glenn R. Winters 
ed., 1975) (“Everyone seems content to operate on the assumption that the donning of 
judicial robes makes a man competent to perform all duties of office.” In fact, however, 
“[a] judge needs opportunity, time and assistance in the reduction of his ignorance. In 
many instances it will not be a case of re-tooling—it will be tooling up for the first 
time.”); Richard S. Arnold, Irving L. Goldberg Lecture, Southern Methodist University 
Dedman School of Law: The Federal Courts: Causes of Discontent, 56 SMU L. REV. 767, 
771 (2003) (“You may find it a little disconcerting that people who are appointed to the 
bench need to go to school to learn how to do it. We hope that they know something 
before they are appointed . . . .”). 
 14 On Becoming a Judge, supra note 2, at 139 (“I think one of the reasons we 
have so little systematic and solid study of this is that it’s difficult.”). 
 15 For contemporaries’ views of de Grey, see 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE 
MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY 128 (1992) [hereinafter OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS]; 1 HORACE 
TWISS, THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE OF LORD CHANCELLOR ELDON 113 (London, John 
Murray, 2d ed. 1844) (“One of the most considerable among the judges of that time was 
Lord Chief Justice De Grey. ‘He was the object,’ says Mr. Farrer, ‘of Lord Eldon’s 
highest commendation. He spoke of him as a most accomplished lawyer, and of most 
extraordinary power of memory.’”). 
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concept encompassing variously the pre-judicial career, 
acclimation to institutional norms, integration into the court 
organization, and acquisition of required knowledge.16 This 
Article focuses on only one piece of the socialization puzzle: 
that of education in the procedural and substantive law. To a 
much lesser extent it touches on evidence of the transition from 
advocate to judge and the familiarization with court 
administration. By judicial education is meant any attempt to 
learn the rules, procedures, or history of the court or to prepare 
legal reference tools for use while hearing or preparing to hear 
cases. It excludes the use of reports or of certain canonical 
works in the preparation of opinions in the ordinary course of 
the judge’s job. The citation to authorities was a normal part of 
the opinion process for all judges of the time, whether new or 
long-serving. 
Furthermore, because most of the archival material 
concerns the books Chief Justice de Grey bought or used during 
his first two years on the bench, this Article concentrates on 
the book-learning aspect of judicial education. An important 
part of de Grey’s studies appears to have involved very basic 
practice manuals and textbooks. That de Grey used books 
ought to have been then, as now, unremarkable. Yet given the 
insignificant attention such elementary works have garnered, 
few legal historians might have guessed that a highly 
experienced barrister like de Grey would have turned to basic 
student manuals for his information. Such a finding introduces 
a caveat into the current assumption that these sorts of works 
played little role in the development of English law prior to the 
nineteenth century.17 In other words, the de Grey materials 
give entrée into two significant historical questions with 
modern resonance: how did judges learn their jobs and what 
kinds of texts shaped the development of the law? 
Beyond the serendipity of the archival collections that 
permit an at least partial reconstruction of what de Grey did to 
teach himself how to be a judge, he is also an ideal exemplar 
because he took a well-blazed path to the bench. Called to the 
bar in 1742, he benefited early from patronage, became a king’s 
  
 16 See, e.g., Alpert, Atkins & Ziller, supra note 2, at 325-36; Cook, supra note 
2, at 254; On Becoming a Judge, supra note 2, at 140. 
 17 Michael Lobban, The English Legal Treatise and English Law in the 
Eighteenth Century, 13 IURIS SCRIPTA HISTORICA 69, 70 (1997); A.W.B. Simpson, The 
Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, 
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 639 (1981).  
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counsel in 1758, solicitor general to the queen in 1761, solicitor 
general in 1763, and finally attorney general in 1766.18 He was 
a loyal government man, who served ten years in Parliament 
and even turned down an offer of the Chancellorship.19 While 
attorney general, he maintained a lucrative private practice, 
becoming one of the first barristers to earn over £8000 in a 
year.20 Such a résumé made him as completely qualified for his 
judicial appointment as one could be at the time. If he needed 
to read textbooks to learn the law and procedure of his court, so 
would many other judges of the age. 
After discussing in Part I the historical reasons for the 
creation of the myth of the pre-trained judge and, conversely, 
the reasons for a new judge’s lack of preparation, the Article 
turns in Part II to the usual methods of judicial education 
suggested by both the modern scholarship and the eighteenth-
century evidence. Part III investigates the set of procedural 
books de Grey acquired soon after becoming a judge and asks 
what he might have learned from them. Part IV examines how, 
paralleling the practices of modern judges, he created his own 
bench book for use at trial. 
I. WHY JUDGES NEEDED AN EDUCATION 
The common law judiciary has been built on the 
assumption that legal practice is the best preparation for being 
a judge.21 Given centuries of evidence that practitioners quite 
often do not “learn how to judge on the way to the bench,” this 
belief must have its roots in the distant past.22 This Part argues 
that the mystique of judicial preparedness arose from 
conditions unique to the medieval English legal community, 
while the need for education grew up in response to changes in 
the way law was practiced from the sixteenth century onward. 
In his classic work on the history of judges, John 
Dawson points out a startling fact. In medieval and early 
  
 18 On de Grey’s early patronage positions, see LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 
162 and DUMAN, supra note 10, at 64-65.  
 19 Gordon Goodwin, rev. M. J. Mercer, Grey, William de, First Baron 
Walsingham (1719-1781), in 23 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 897 
(H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison eds. 2004) (giving a biography of de Grey); 4 
HORACE WALPOLE, MEMOIRS OF THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE THE THIRD 420 (London, 
Richard Bentley 1845) (recounting refusal of offer of Chancellorship). 
 20 DUMAN, supra note 10, at 107. 
 21 See On Becoming a Judge, supra note 2, at 139-41. 
 22 Id. at 139. 
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modern France, the royal courts were staffed by thousands of 
judges.23 By contrast, in England until the nineteenth century, 
“the permanent judges of the central courts of common law and 
Chancery, all taken together, rarely exceeded fifteen.”24 Those 
central common law courts—King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and 
Exchequer—sitting in Westminster and staffed, in de Grey’s 
time, by four judges apiece, dealt with the mass of litigation 
flowing in from all over England.25 On the one hand, therefore, 
only an extremely small number of judges had to be prepared 
to serve, and they could, in theory, be quickly socialized into 
courts with a long institutional memory, a small bar, and a 
coherent body of case law. On the other hand, a very few judges 
carried the weight of the nation’s legal system on their 
shoulders, and they needed to know what they were doing. 
When seeking an answer to the question of the origin of 
the belief that legal practice prepared judges for the bench, a 
dominant factor seems to be the existence in the Middle Ages of 
a single, tightly-knit hierarchy with the judge at the top as a 
primus inter pares.26 Unlike the continental civil law judge 
today, who is often largely isolated from the bar, the medieval 
English judge spent his career immersed in it.27 He learned the 
law as a student in an inn of court. He joined the inn when he 
became a member of the bar and often progressed up the ranks 
of its leadership.28 Normally, he practiced as a serjeant-at-law, 
an elite group of senior barristers formed in the fourteenth 
century who for a time had precedence at the bar, a monopoly 
over pleading before the Court of Common Pleas, and a 
presumptive right to judicial appointments.29 As a serjeant, the 
future judge served a sort of judicial apprenticeship. He could 
dine and have his chambers at the Serjeants’ Inns alongside 
the judges, with whom he would discuss thorny legal issues 
  
 23 DAWSON, supra note 8, at 2. 
 24 Id. at 3. 
 25 Id. at 2-3. 
 26 6 JOHN BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1483-1558, at 
411 (John Baker ed., 2003) [hereinafter BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY]; PREST, supra note 
10, at 74.  
 27 BELL, supra note 9, at 79-80. 
 28 PREST, supra note 10, at 135-36. 
 29 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 157-58, 166 
(4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter BAKER, INTRODUCTION]; JOHN HAMILTON BAKER, THE 
ORDER OF SERJEANTS AT LAW: A CHRONICLE OF CREATIONS, WITH RELATED TEXTS AND A 
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 14-15, 36, 42, 46 (1984) [hereinafter BAKER, SERJEANTS]. 
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and imbibe the collegiality of the bench.30 When a judge could 
not go on assize, a serjeant would fill in, hearing cases with his 
circuit partner, a real judge, nearby.31 Thus, by the time a 
serjeant became a judge, he had acquired some experience of 
judging, knew the members of the court, and had for years 
watched them discuss and decide cases. 
As a judge, he continued to participate in the same legal 
community in which he had spent his career as a practitioner. 
He retained a connection with his inn, and he mingled with the 
serjeants, whom he called his “brothers,” in the Serjeants’ 
Inns.32 As a leading member of this legal community, the judge 
was an important conduit for the body of orally-transmitted 
knowledge called the “common erudition” or the “communis 
opinio” that all active members of the bar shared.33 The 
common erudition, worked out as much in the teaching 
exercises and the discussions in the Inns of Court as from the 
bench, created an oral tradition of “received learning.”34 Thus, 
an experienced practitioner would presumably have possessed 
much the same expertise as the judges just by having spent 
sufficient time in the same legal culture. Consequently, it is not 
difficult to imagine how a serjeant could be assumed to move 
from bar to bench without needing to re-equip his toolkit. 
But by the sixteenth century, a number of changes had 
been set in motion that would end the hegemony of the 
communis opinio, alter the practice of law, and turn judges into 
a different species of legal officer rather than merely the most 
esteemed lawyers among equals. First, the number and power 
of ordinary barristers increased dramatically in the sixteenth 
century. Where “[t]he medieval legal profession had been in 
  
 30 BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 166; 6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY, 
supra note 26, at 411-12; 12 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 15 
(1938); cf. Wasby, supra note 2, at 13 (forms of judicial apprenticeship in the modern 
American judicial system). 
 31 BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 166; BAKER, SERJEANTS, supra 
note 29, at 36. 
 32 6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 26, at 411-12. 
 33 See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 198; J.H. BAKER, THE LAW’S 
TWO BODIES 67-70, 81-82, 161-69 (2001) [hereinafter BAKER, LAW’S TWO BODIES]; J.H. 
Baker, The Inns of Court and Legal Doctrine, in THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: 
LAWYERS, BOOKS AND THE LAW 37, 43, 50 (2000) [hereinafter Baker, Inns of Court]; 
David Ibbetson, Case-Law and Doctrine: a Historical Perspective on the English 
Common Law, in RICHTERRECT UND RECHTSFORTBILDUNG IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN 
RECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT 27, 34-35 (Reiner Schulze & Ulrike Seif eds., 2003). 
 34 See 6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 26, at 471-72 (“[I]t was in the 
inns, rather than in Westminster Hall, that those principles were expounded and 
refined as a coherent body of law.”); BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 198.  
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effect a guild, whose journeyman members practised their 
trade . . . under the oversight of a body of masters, the judges 
and serjeants at law,” the early modern bar was more of an 
open market, where men with ability or connections could rise 
in the profession without being constrained by the old 
hierarchy.35 
From this group of upstarts there emerged in the 
sixteenth century a new leadership: the solicitor and attorney 
general and the king’s counsel.36 King’s counsel were royal law 
officers who, though remaining members of the bar, took cases 
on behalf of the King and could not appear against the Crown 
in their private practice without license.37 The new king’s 
counsel acquired a right of precedence in court, immediately 
jumping over other members of the bar, including most 
serjeants, in seniority.38 Being forever trapped beneath the 
king’s counsel lessened the desirability of becoming a serjeant, 
which in turn meant that the finest barristers were no longer 
to be found amongst their ranks.39 Consequently, king’s counsel 
became the preferred credential for judicial selection.40 
By the mid-eighteenth century, although no single path 
to the bench had emerged, certain “avenues of advancement” 
were common, and these centered on indications of political 
loyalty and excellence at the bar.41 Future judges usually spent 
over two decades in practice before their elevation.42 Over half 
were king’s counsel, and many had their preeminence at the 
bar recognized by an appointment to serve as solicitor and/or 
attorney general.43 In addition, half—and over ninety percent of 
the chief justices of King’s Bench and Common Pleas—had 
spent time in Parliament.44 These men may have been excellent 
lawyers and in some instances skilled politicians, but they had 
not necessarily been trained to serve as judges on the courts to 
which they were appointed. 
  
 35 PREST, supra note 10, at 75. 
 36 See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 158; BAKER, SERJEANTS, 
supra note 29, at 108, 111-14, 116-17; PREST, supra note 10, at 75. 
 37 BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 165. 
 38 Id. at 164-65. 
 39 See LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 174. 
 40 Id. at 262, tbl. 7.1, 264. 
 41 DUMAN, supra note 10, at 73. 
 42 Id. at 72. 
 43 Id. at 73-75. 
 44 Id. at 78, 87. 
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This lack of training posed a particularly pressing 
problem for the Court of Common Pleas because, with one 
exception, only serjeants could appear before that court.45 The 
sole exception was the attorney general, who was permitted “to 
address the court from within the bar as an officer, though not 
to take the place of a serjeant at the bar. . . .”46 But such 
appearances seem to have been rare and occurred only in the 
attorney general’s official capacity and not in his private 
practice.47 Yet, despite the serjeants’ monopoly over the Court, 
during the eighteenth century the most trod path to the chief 
justiceship of Common Pleas lay precisely through service as 
the attorney general.48 Almost by definition, this man had not 
been a serjeant, and while he may have appeared before the 
Court occasionally in his governmental role, he did not have 
the day-to-day expertise gained by long attendance at the 
Court’s bar.49 Indeed, given the status of Common Pleas in that 
era as second fiddle to King’s Bench, the new chief justice may 
not even have observed the Court very often while a student or 
young barrister.50 Furthermore, Common Pleas had remained a 
more traditionally procedural and black letter court than 
Chancery or King’s Bench, where the former attorney general 
was likely to have spent much of his time.51 The new chief may 
consequently have come to his job quite unfamiliar with the 
  
 45 BAKER, SERJEANTS, supra note 29, at 42. 
 46 Id. at 43 n.5. 
 47 Wilson’s Common Pleas Reports for the period 1753 to 1774 include only 
one explicit mention of the Attorney General appearing before the Court. Rex v. 
Serjeant Mead, (1754) 2 Wils. 17. Even in the famous case of King v. Wilkes, when the 
Common Pleas granted Wilkes’s petition for habeas corpus, Wilson only records 
serjeants arguing on behalf of the Crown. King v. Wilkes, (1763) 2 Wils. 151, 156. A 
search of the Court’s rule books would undoubtedly turn up more appearances, but the 
fact remains that the attorney general did not spend a great deal of his time before the 
Court. 
 48 DUMAN, supra note 10, at 84, 87. 
 49 None of the solicitors or attorneys general of the eighteenth century had 
been serjeants. 
 50 See LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 172, 174; ROSE A. MELIKAN, JOHN SCOTT, 
LORD ELDON, 1751-1838: THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 154 (1999) (calling Common Pleas 
“something of a judicial backwater”); 1 OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 
15, at 124-25; James C. Oldham, Underreported and Underrated: The Court of 
Common Pleas in the Eighteenth Century, in LAW AS CULTURE AND CULTURE AS LAW: 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN PHILIP REID 119, 119 (John Philip Reid, Hendrik Hartog, 
William E. Nelson & Barbara Wilcie Kern eds., 2000). 
 51 See BAKER, SERJEANTS, supra note 29, at 117; 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 
30, at 452-53; LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 183 (“[L]ists of leading counsel show that 
the attorney-general and solicitor-general, whose privileged positions allowed them to 
pick and choose among the most lucrative briefs, generally chose to concentrate their 
private practice in Chancery.”). 
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basic operation of the court over which he found himself 
presiding. 
At the same time as the number of lawyers expanded 
and the path to the bench ceased to lead inexorably through an 
apprenticeship as a serjeant, the communis opinio also broke 
down.52 In the Middle Ages, the primary arena of interest to the 
legal community had been the back and forth between pleaders 
and judges aimed at the establishment of the pleadings in each 
case. “[M]uch of th[is] debate was tentative, extempore and 
inconclusive,” looking not so much for a ruling but rather for an 
indication of the tactical moves the pleader should make.53 But 
by the sixteenth century, the lawyers had begun to draft their 
pleadings in writing, working them out between the parties, 
and without the assistance of the judges.54 When the case did 
finally come before the court on a point of law, the lawyers 
wanted answers, not debate, and those answers were supposed 
to be supported by chapter and verse citation to the case law 
reported more and more in authoritative, printed works.55 
As a result, the position of the judge within the legal 
hierarchy changed. He was no longer the master who labored 
side-by-side with his journeymen. He now sat apart, tasked to 
rule on disputes brought before him, and confronted with the 
prospect that his words would be captured by reporters, 
published, and cited as the law in the future. If the 
observations of modern judges are any guide, this was a 
seismic shift. Judges today speak of the difficulty of learning 
“that there comes a time when he or she has to make a 
decision.”56 This is not a skill that a lawyer, even one who 
counsels clients rather than litigates, necessarily has to 
master. 
The difficulty of moving from advocate to decision-
maker can be glimpsed on de Grey’s court in the 1770s. The 
  
 52 See Ibbetson, supra note 33, at 34-35 (discussing the decline of the 
communis opinio during the sixteenth century and its disappearance by 1600); see also 
BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 198-99; Baker, Inns of Court, supra note 33, 
at 50-51; Richard J. Ross, The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers: 
Memory as Keyword, Shelter, and Identity, 1560-1640, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 229, 
267-68 (1998). 
 53 BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 197-98; see also 6 BAKER, OXFORD 
HISTORY, supra note 26, at 386-89. 
 54 See 6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 26, at 338-39. 
 55 See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 29, at 198. 
 56 On Becoming a Judge, supra note 2, at 142. (“The inability to make 
decisions is an occupational hazard to which an unusually large number of our trial 
judges are exposed to and exhibit.”). 
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most junior justice on the Court was George Nares, who had 
spent over a decade as a serjeant and a leader of the Common 
Pleas bar.57 He also did an active business in writing opinions of 
counsel advising on questions of law based on a set of facts 
presented by the client or solicitor.58 With regard to the 
substantive law and procedure, Nares probably had little to 
learn when he took the bench. He knew the case law of the 
Court better than any of his brethren, a fact he demonstrated 
frequently in his opinions, which were generally reported as 
consisting of little more than citing precedential cases, usually 
from Common Pleas and usually ones that had been decided 
while he was at the bar.59 Yet of all his colleagues, he also 
seems to have had the most trouble becoming accustomed to 
making up his mind and was unsurprisingly not considered a 
strong judge.60 
  
 57 See BAKER, SERJEANTS, supra note 29, at 528; LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 
172. Nares was said to have been “bred an att[orne]y, called to the bar.” Bray Family 
Papers, Surrey History Centre, G52/8/10/1, s.v. George Nares (recollections by the 
solicitor, William Bray, of leading people of his time, in alphabetical order by last name 
of person, no page numbers). 
 58 See BAKER, LAW’S TWO BODIES, supra note 33, at 87-88. For a large 
collection of Nares’s opinions, see Philadelphia Free Library, MS. LC.14.77. 
 59 E.g., Manuscript Reports, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Hill MS. 15, fol. 32 
(Parsons v. Lloyd, (1772) 2 W. Bl. 845; 3 Wils. 341) (citing cases); The Warden and the 
Commonalty of the Mystery of Grocers v. Backhouse, (1771) 3 Wils. 221, 227 (comment 
at the end of the first argument, citing precedent); Sanderson v. Baker, (1772) 3 Wils. 
309, 317 (“I know of three actions of trespass against the sheriff in cases of this kind. 
Tyler versus Johnson, B.R. tried at Stafford in 1764 . . . ; I remember a similar case 
tried before Lord Chief Justice Wilmot, who was of opinion . . . ; I also remember a 
third action of the same kind . . . .”); Stevenson v. Hardie, (1773) 2 Bl. 872, 874; 
Manuscript Reports, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Hill MS. 11, fol. 66 (“J. Nares was of ye 
same op[inio]n and to prove that the copyh[ol]d does not derive und[e]r ye L[or]d he 
cited these cases . . . all w[hi]ch he observed.”); see also Smedley v. Hill, (1776) 2 W. Bl. 
1105, 1106 (Nares had tried the case and had made a ruling on evidence that was 
overturned en banc. Blackstone reported that Nares “with great candour admitted the 
determination to be wrong; and cited a case before Willes, C.J. . . . wherein such 
evidence was admitted.”). 
 60 Bray Family Papers, Surrey History Centre, G52/8/10/1,, s.v. Nares. 
Samples of Nares’s inability to make up his mind can be found in Cox v. Chubb, (1772) 
2 W. Bl. 809, 810; Glead v. McKay, (1774) 2 W. Bl. 956, 957; Flureau v. Thornhill, 
(1776) 2 W. Bl. 1078, 1079. In Howell v. Hanforth, according to de Grey’s bench notes, 
Nares said that he at first disagreed with the rule the majority put forth because the 
plaintiff had not followed the proper procedure but then let himself be persuaded to 
agree. William de Grey Bench Notes, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Misc. MS. 183, fol. 21r. 
When presiding over a trial on circuit in 1776, Nares had to rule on the admissibility of 
evidence. Plaintiff had brought suit against a pastor for non-residence in his rectory 
and wanted to introduce evidence that the pastor had confessed himself to be the 
rector. Defendant objected that such parol evidence was inadmissible. Unable to decide, 
Nares “sent to consult Forster Serj[ean]t (who went that Circuit with him as Judge) & 
by him was informed that ye same point had been determined lately on the Norfolk 
Circuit by Willes J. The plaintiff therefore was nonsuited.” The following term, King’s 
Bench set aside the nonsuit, finding that such parol evidence against the interest of 
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Beyond learning how to make a decision, the new judge 
also had to know the law and procedure of his court, and this 
could pose a problem because, by at least the seventeenth 
century, some leading members of the bar had begun to 
specialize.61 A man might have all or most of his practice in 
Chancery—a court of equity whose rules and procedures were 
quite different from those of the common law courts62—or take 
primarily revenue cases in Exchequer, or do criminal work at 
the London criminal court, the Old Bailey, and King’s Bench.63 
Because Chancery was the court of choice for 
eighteenth-century legal “high-flyers,” many newly-appointed 
chief justices in de Grey’s time found that their “promotion to a 
chief justiceship . . . involved hasty revision of their old 
common law knowledge, and no little personal nervousness 
about their competence on the bench.”64 Philip Yorke, who had 
primarily practiced in Chancery after achieving some renown 
as a barrister, and who thereafter served as chief justice of 
King’s Bench from 1733 to 1737,65 worried that “he had 
forgot[ten] his old practice in [King’s Bench] for many years 
and was extremely uneasy how he should acquit himself in his 
new office.”66 A similar concern about his lack of familiarity 
with the common law was expressed about the appointment of 
the Chancery practitioner, Dudley Ryder, to the chief 
justiceship of King’s Bench in 1754.67 De Grey faced this 
problem as well, for he had spent much of the approximately 
  
defendant was admissible. Manuscript Reports, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Misc. MS. 551, 
fols. 17b-18 (Beavan v. Williams, before Nares at Hereford Spring Assize, 1776). 
 61 See PREST, supra note 10, at 70-71. 
 62 See LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 184 (“[E]quity cases . . . traditionally 
depended on natural law, reason, and ‘conscience’ rather than the issues of law or fact 
tried at common law.”). 
 63 Id. at 169, 171, 177-78, 181, 210-11. 
 64 Id. at 171. 
 65 Peter D. G. Thomas, Yorke, Philip, First Earl of Hardwicke (1690-1764), in 
60 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 847-49 (2004). 
 66 Id. at 171 (internal quotation marks omitted). Interestingly, Yorke received 
the chief justiceship of King’s Bench rather than becoming Chancellor because the 
other candidate, “Charles Talbot, . . . was almost exclusively an equity lawyer, with 
little knowledge of the Common Law; and he would have found the duties of Chief 
Justice of the King’s Bench . . . both difficult and distasteful. He desired ardently to 
remain in the Court of Chancery.” 1 PHILIP C. YORKE, THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE 
OF PHILIP YORKE, EARL OF HARDWICKE, LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT BRITAIN 
117 (1913). At the time, Yorke, who also had a large Chancery practice, was attorney 
general and Talbot solicitor general. Id. at 116. 
 67 LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 171 n.77. 
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twenty years prior to his appointment as a Chancery 
barrister.68 
Finally, the early modern English common law judge 
did not take the bench prepared to do his job because the scope 
of that job had widened considerably over the centuries to 
include matters that no individual practitioner would have 
mastered. In addition to his central tasks of hearing questions 
of law when sitting en banc at Westminster Hall and questions 
of fact when presiding individually over jury trials held during 
circuits (called assizes) twice a year in the country, the judge 
also heard both civil and criminal trials in London and 
Westminster throughout the year, served on admiralty and 
ecclesiastical appeals panels alongside civilian lawyers and 
churchmen, advised the House of Lords acting in its judicial 
capacity, advised the government on pardons in criminal cases, 
helped Parliament draw up legislation and advised it on 
petitions, and decided administrative appeals on tax matters.69 
  
 68 Id. at 353 (listing de Grey as one of the leaders of the Chancery bar in 
1770). In de Grey’s papers are several sets of accounts of fees received from 1764-1770. 
The accounts separate out the source of the fees, for example, briefs in King’s Bench, or 
Chancery, or Exchequer. De Grey only listed Common Pleas once in that time. The 
1764 account has an entry: “King’s Bench & Common Pleas……115:7—.” This appears 
to be his fees for being on brief in arguments before these two courts. (In later accounts 
this is made more explicit.) By way of comparison, the same year, out of a total income 
of over £4623, he earned over £237 for briefs in Exchequer and £114 9s. for briefs in the 
“Cockpit,” a reference to the Privy Council chamber at Whitehall Palace. See GEORGE 
H. CUNNINGHAM, LONDON: BEING A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF THE HISTORY, 
TRADITION & HISTORICAL ASSOCIATIONS OF BUILDINGS & MONUMENTS, ARRANGED 
UNDER STREETS IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER 789 (1927); 2 EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER, 
THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 
1603-1784, at 43, 49 (1928). The same trends appear throughout the accounts. He 
earned far more on Chancery briefs than in any other court, but also substantial 
amounts in Exchequer, and in briefs for the House of Lords. In 1766 and 1770, he listed 
no briefs in King’s Bench. His 1768 King’s Bench fees were his highest for that court at 
just over £264 (though this also included Old Bailey briefs), but his Exchequer total 
that year was over £313. See Accounts of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS 
XIII/6/3-8, 10. Even while solicitor and attorney general, he was seemingly almost 
entirely absent from the motions books of King’s Bench. By contrast, his predecessor in 
those two positions, Fletcher Norton, had been a constant presence in the motions 
books while holding the royal offices. See King’s Bench Rule Books, National Archives 
(Kew, London), KB 125/158 (1763-64), KB 125/160 (1767), KB 125/161 (1769). 
 69 Concerning the job of the common law court judges see variously: 
ABSTRACT OF CASES AND DECISIONS ON APPEALS RELATING TO THE TAX ON SERVANTS 
passim (London, T. Longman & T. Cadell 1781) (on tax appeals); G.I.O. DUNCAN, THE 
HIGH COURT OF DELEGATES 178-81 (1971) (on ecclesiastical appeals); 1 W.S. 
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 244-45 (7th ed. 1956) (sitting as an appellate 
court in Exchequer Chamber); 1 OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 15, 
118-19 (sitting en banc at Westminster and at trials in London and Westminster), 135-
36 (concerning pardons); HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF 
PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 115 (London, J. Butterworth 2d ed. 1827) (on trials en banc 
at Westminster); A.S. TURBERVILLE, THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN THE XVIIITH CENTURY 
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Add to this that the chief justice served on the privy council,70 
and that he had to manage a large staff of mostly sinecured 
underlings with often obstructive traditions to which they 
clung as their prerogative, and the difficulty of the job becomes 
readily apparent.71 
Referring to the baby judge school, one recent judicial 
appointee said, “I cannot imagine taking on such a multifaceted 
responsibility as becoming a federal district judge without 
having such classes and materials available . . . .”72 An 
eighteenth-century English judge had responsibilities far more 
multifaceted than his modern counterpart could imagine, and 
he had no orientation course to attend. Yet he must have 
figured out how to do his job, for the English legal system did 
not grind to a halt, and “the perpetuation of the judicial system 
[is] dependent on the successful socialization of its judges.”73 
The next Part explores how he might have accomplished this. 
II. THE METHODS OF JUDICIAL EDUCATION 
According to modern studies of judicial education, 
judges use four basic strategies to teach themselves what they 
need to know to do their jobs. First, they rely on skills they 
acquired before joining the court.74 Second, they learn on the 
fly, for example, by asking lawyers at trial to review the law 
and precedent.75 Third, they consult “more experienced 
colleagues.”76 Finally, they read books in an organized program 
of self-study.77 Nowadays, of course, they might also attend 
baby judge schools and continuing judicial education courses, 
  
10-11 (1927) (advising the House of Lords); John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-
Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8, 34-35 
(1983) (presiding at Old Bailey trials); the eighteenth-century Journals of the House of 
Lords are full of references to petitions being referred to the judges and the judges 
being ordered to draw up a new bill. 
 70 2 TURNER, supra note 68, at 25-26. 
 71 See, for example, the cases that came before de Grey and Common Pleas 
concerning the tradition of the Court’s sealing office to close on certain days that were 
not Court holidays and to charge exorbitant fees for deigning to seal documents on 
those days. Sparrow v. Cooper (1779) 2 W. Bl. 1314, 1314-15; Figgins v. Willie (1778) 2 
W. Bl. 1186, 1186-87.  
 72 “Baby Judges School” Jump Starts Learning Process, supra note 4, at 1 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73 Carp & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 363-64. 
 74 Id. at 369-71. 
 75 Id. at 380-81. 
 76 Id. at 374-76. 
 77 Id. at 387. 
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but such classes are arguably not a great deal more than an 
extension of talking to colleagues and reading books. 
Eighteenth-century judges also apparently employed 
the same four learning strategies. The normal pre-judicial 
preparation has already been discussed, so the focus here will 
be on the other three methods. Of the group, the evidence for 
learning on the fly is the most limited. Reporters did not record 
verbatim what was said in court,78 and they may have been 
particularly unlikely to write down, and later publish, 
examples of judges demonstrating their ignorance. 
Nonetheless, we do conserve at least two cases in which 
relatively new chief justices of Common Pleas admitted to not 
knowing the law. In the first, from 1784, Chief Justice 
Loughborough, who joined the Court in 1780 when de Grey 
resigned, asked for an explanation of the meaning of the 
statute under dispute, demonstrating in his disagreement with 
counsel that he did not understand the intent of the provision.79 
Justice Gould, at this time the longest-serving member of the 
court, explained the act, eliciting from Loughborough an 
astonished, “I had no Idea in all my practice but [that?] it 
extends to Cases prosecuted.”80 In the second instance, from 
1800, Lord Eldon, who had become chief justice only seven 
months before, made a similar remark in court: “I confess, that 
when this application was first made, I was not aware, that 
under the circumstances of the case the Defendant was entitled 
to demand judgment: but my Brother Heath has satisfied me 
that the application is supported by the current of 
  
 78 See, e.g., CAPEL LOFFT, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF 
KING’S BENCH, at xi, xiii (W. Strahan and M. Woodfall, 1776) (although claiming to 
take down the opinions “almost verbatim,” acknowledging that he did not necessarily 
include everything that was said and did sometimes merely summarize) (emphasis 
omitted); 1 SYLVESTER DOUGLAS, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE 
COURT OF KING’S BENCH; IN THE NINETEENTH, TWENTIETH, AND TWENTY-FIRST YEARS 
OF THE REIGN OF GEORGE III, at xiv (London, His Majesty’s Law-Printers, 2d ed. 1786) 
(“The judgments of the court I could have wished to give in the words in which they 
were delivered. But this I often found to be impracticable, as I neither write short-
hand, nor very quickly. Memory, however, while the case was recent, supplied at home, 
many of the chasms which I had left in court . . . .”). 
 79 Manuscript Reports, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Hill MS. 21, fols. 119-120 
(Nixon v. Clarke (1784)) (concerning the interpretation of an act instructing that if an 
excise officer obtained a certificate of probable cause from a judge before executing a 
seizure, the plaintiff should get no court costs). Alexander Wedderburn (Lord 
Loughborough, later Earl of Rosslyn) was attorney general from 1778 to 1780, chief 
justice of Common Pleas from 1780 to 1793, and Chancellor from 1793 to 1801. 
Alexander Murdoch, Wedderburn, Alexander, First Earl of Rosslyn (1733-1805), in 57 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 909. 
 80 Manuscript Reports, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Hill MS. 21, fol. 121. 
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authorities.”81 Similarly, special juries of merchants often 
educated judges on commercial customs and practices in 
mercantile cases.82 
Some evidence suggests that new judges also used the 
third method of education and sought advice from their more 
knowledgeable colleagues not only about legal matters but also 
about life on the court. Lord Mansfield, when he became chief 
justice of King’s Bench, sent drafts of his opinions to two of his 
well regarded associate justices for their advice, and the third, 
Thomas Denison, supposedly taught Mansfield about 
pleading.83 Mansfield’s predecessor, Dudley Ryder, received 
advice from his predecessor, Charles Yorke, that “Denison 
would be a useful man in point of law to me especially in the 
form [of pleading] in which he was very good.”84 Ryder took 
Yorke’s suggestion and consulted Denison, “who ‘professed 
great readiness to acquaint me of everything he knew.’”85 And 
when John Eardley Wilmot joined the Court and confessed a 
concern about hearing cases on circuit, Denison volunteered to 
“go with him all round the circuit because of the difficulty of 
the judge’s going the first time.”86 
Unlike Mansfield and Ryder, however, de Grey had no 
group of experienced associate—or puisne—justices to advise 
him when he took the bench.87 George Nares joined the Court 
the same day he did, and William Blackstone had only been 
  
 81 Keepers & Governors of the Possession, &c. of Harrow School v. Alderton, 
(1800) 2 Bos. & Pul. 86, 87; E. A. Smith, Scott, John, First Earl of Eldon (1751-1838), 
in 49 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 420-21. “Heath” 
was John Heath, who became a judge on the Common Pleas when Blackstone died in 
1780. 
 82 See, for example, the 1798 maritime case of Thwaits v. Angerstein before 
King’s Bench, where Chief Justice Kenyon “professed himself totally ignorant of 
navigation, except in so far as he had learned it from his apprenticeship in his judicial 
office. He had received a great deal of information from the different classes of 
merchants by whom he had had the honour of being assisted in the administration of 
justice.” Law Report, TIMES, Nov. 14, 1798, at 3. (The author thanks James Oldham for 
this reference.) 
 83 1 OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 15, at 53, 55. 
 84 Id. at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85 Id. at 55. 
 86 Id. at 55 n.31 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 129-30 
(detailing entries in the Ryder diaries concerning information he learned from other 
judges and court officers about the various circuits). 
 87 Cf. 1 OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 15, at 53, 55 (Dudley 
Ryder, Chief Justice of King’s Bench from 1754 to 1756 and his successor, Lord 
Mansfield, Chief Justice from 1756 to 1788, both took advice from their more 
experienced puisne justices). 
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appointed the previous year.88 De Grey could and perhaps did 
rely on his senior puisne, Henry Gould, a solid judge who was 
then in his eighth year on Common Pleas.89 But the new Chief 
Justice may not have known Gould very well, for before his 
appointment Gould had been an unremarkable barrister, had 
never been a member of Parliament, and had been serving on a 
court before which de Grey did not practice.90 
Perhaps as a consequence of having no colleague to 
whom he felt comfortable turning for guidance, de Grey chose 
(at least in part) the final method: he read books. In his first 
ten months on the bench, he purchased six basic books on 
pleading and procedure. The following year, he bought a new 
edition of Francis Buller’s Introduction to the Law Relative to 
Trials at Nisi Prius and proceeded to restructure it into a 
bench book to which he could refer while on circuit. The specific 
details of these acquisitions and how de Grey used them will be 
examined in the following two Parts. For now, the question is 
not only why de Grey sought information from books but also 
  
 88 2 W. Bl. at 734-35. 
 89 On Gould as a judge, see Emily Kadens, Justice Blackstone’s Common Law 
Orthodoxy, 103 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). Blackstone, for instance, at least 
twice sought Gould’s advice on cases. 2 THE POLYANTHEA: OR, A COLLECTION OF 
INTERESTING FRAGMENTS, IN PROSE AND VERSE: CONSISTING OF ORIGINAL ANECDOTES, 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES, DIALOGUES, LETTERS, CHARACTERS, ETC. 195 (London, J. 
Budd 1804) (Letter from Blackstone to Gould datable to April 1774). Blackstone wrote: 
“Mr. Blackstone hopes he has not been too presumptuous in thus intruding a second 
time on Mr. Justice Gould’s goodness, which nothing but an anxiety to perform the task 
which he has undertaken with as much accuracy as possible, would have induced him 
to have done.” Id. 
 90 Gould appears to have obtained his appointment to the bench (originally to 
the Exchequer, then after two years to Common Pleas) by means of patronage. His wife 
had an “interest” with the Chancellor at the time, and the Chancellor appointed puisne 
justices. Bray, supra note 57, s.v. Gould. On barristers knowing the Common Pleas 
judges see the observations of the lawyer, Isaac Espinasse, about bar and bench 
relations in the 1790s: “With the judges of the Court of Common Pleas, or Barons of the 
Exchequer, the members of the King’s Bench Bar had little intercourse. It was confined 
to occasional meetings at nisi prius or on the circuit.” [Isaac Espinasse], My 
Contemporaries: from the Note-Book of a Retired Barrister, 6 FRASER’S MAG. 220, 427 
(1832). This would have been less true of de Grey, who would have interacted with the 
judges in his position as solicitor and then attorney general, but his dealings with 
Gould may have been limited to the performance of his official functions. However, if 
the chocolate and on one occasion, diet bread, de Grey purchased for Gould can be 
understood as his way of showing his appreciation, then during his years as chief de 
Grey probably came to rely heavily on his senior puisne, in particular because bad 
episodes of gout frequently forced de Grey to miss sittings. See, e.g., Accounting 
Records of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/16/13 (Feb. 24, 1780) 
(“[P]aid for Diet Bread for Mr. Justice Gould at Westmr 0.0.6.”); id. (Feb. 14, 1780) 
(“[P]aid for Chocolate for Mr. Justice Gould at Guild Hall 0.1.0.”). Other examples of 
records showing de Grey buying chocolate for Gould are at: Norfolk Record Office, WLS 
LV/13/14 (June 14, 1776 and June 24, 1776); WLS LV/13/20 (April 26, 1776). 
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why he selected the particular sorts of practice manuals and 
reference works he did. 
In an early but still seminal study of modern judicial 
education, the authors found that “the judge himself is 
responsible for much of his own socialization simply by going to 
his library and consulting the casebooks, legal treatises, 
reporters, and statute books which pertain to his particular 
judicial problems.”91 One judge interviewed admitted that his 
judicial education consisted of “an extensive study program, on 
the weekends and even at night.”92 For de Grey, too, turning to 
books may have been second nature. He came of age in the 
legal profession at a time when students embarking upon a 
legal career depended on textbooks for much of their education. 
The decline of the teaching function of the Inns of Court in the 
seventeenth century and the uncertainty of receiving any real 
training as a law clerk had given books a vital role in preparing 
students for the bar.93 Having been acculturated as students to 
learning the law from books, lawyers appear to have continued 
the practice once they entered the profession.94 In response, the 
legal printers produced a growing stock of textbooks, practice 
manuals, treatises, and reference works to meet the demands 
of both students and practitioners.95 It should come as no 
surprise, therefore, that those same lawyers, when they 
  
 91 Carp & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 387. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 30, at 85-87 (describing how students 
educated themselves); LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 136-37, 139-40, app. B (discussing 
advice given in the eighteenth century to law students, listing books to be read); THE 
DIARY OF DUDLEY RYDER 1715-1716, at 49, 91, 147, 184, 281, 87, 113, 116 (William 
Matthews ed., 1939) (discussing the law books he was studying while a law student); 
Tariq A. Baloch, Law Booksellers and Printers as Agents of Unchange, 66 CAMBRIDGE 
L.J. 389, 419-20 (2007) (quoting letter of a law clerk giving advice in the 1790s to a new 
law student about what books to read); Lobban, supra note 17, at 70 (decline of Inns 
and use of commonplace books). 
 94 Lobban, supra note 17, at 71, 73 (eighteenth-century market in books 
aimed at lawyers); Ian Williams, “He Creditted more the Printed Booke”: Common 
Lawyers’ Receptivity to Print (c. 1550-1640) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
author). With regard to lawyers’ use of practice books and treatises, some evidence 
includes the notes Henry Bathurst, eventually a judge on Common Pleas, took on 
Geoffrey Gilbert’s treatise on evidence, see Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/LB/1/22/2, 
vol. 7; Michael Foster’s notes on Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, JOHN BAKER & ANTHONY 
TAUSSIG, A CATALOGUE OF THE LEGAL MANUSCRIPTS OF ANTHONY TAUSSIG 167 (2007) 
(ms. F2); Chief Justice John Willes’s mention of “Booth on Real Actions” and “Mr. 
Pigot’s Book of Recoveries” in opinions from 1742 and 1744 respectively (Willes 344, 
345 and 444, 451). 
 95 6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 26, at 499-504; Lobban, supra note 
17, at 73-74. 
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ascended to the bench, returned once again to their books to 
teach themselves the law they now needed as judges. 
Fortunately, it is not necessary merely to speculate on 
the judges’ knowledge of such books. Evidence from their 
opinions indicates that they were familiar with a wide range of 
practice books and recent treatises. The overwhelming majority 
of books cited in Common Pleas in the 1770s were case reports 
or the sorts of canonical works Coke discussed in the preface to 
his tenth volume of reports in 1614 and that Blackstone 
denominated works of “intrinsic authority”: Brooke’s, Rolle’s, 
and Fitzherbert’s Abridgments; Littleton’s Tenures; Coke on 
Littleton; Fitzherbert’s New Natura Brevium; Bracton’s de 
Legibus; Coke’s Book of Entries, all works by de Grey’s time 
written well in the distant past.96 Nonetheless, a few more 
recent books also appeared in counsels’ arguments and the 
judges’ opinions. Chief among them were Hale’s and Hawkins’s 
Pleas of the Crown, Gilbert’s History of the Common Pleas, 
Viner’s Abridgment, and Comyns’s Digest. Two of these—the 
Gilbert and the Comyns—would reappear on the list of books 
de Grey bought in his first months on the bench.97 
More unexpectedly, the opinions indicate the judges’ 
familiarity with the sorts of modern treatises and practice 
manuals with which they presumably had grown up 
professionally. In 1738, John Willes, chief justice of Common 
Pleas from 1737 to 1761, called the book, The Common Law 
Epitomiz’d: With Directions How to Prosecute and Defend 
Personal Actions, Very Useful for All Lawyers, Justices of Peace, 
and Gentlemen (1660), by William Glisson and Anthony 
Gulston “a book of good credit,” and George Townesend’s Tables 
of Most of the Printed Presidents of Pleadings, Writs and Retort 
of Writs at the Common Law (1667) “a book of very good 
authority.”98 In a 1757 case he “rel[ied] much” upon that “most 
excellent book,” William Sheppard’s 1641 Touchstone of 
Common Assurances, an early work on conveyancing.99 In 1771, 
Justice Gould made a similar approbatory comment in Dawkes 
v. De Lorane, a case concerning the non-payment of a bill of 
exchange.100 Plaintiff’s counsel objected that defense counsel 
  
 96 See 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 337-
43 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *72. 
 97 See notes 159-164 and accompanying text. 
 98 Kettle v. Bromsall, (1738) Willes 118, 120 (C.B.).  
 99 Roe d. Wilkinson v. Tranmer, (1757) 2 Wils. 75, 78 (C.B.). 
 100 (1771) 3 Wils. 207. 
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“had got all his cases out of Mr. Cunningham’s book of Bills of 
Exchange.”101 Timothy Cunningham’s The Law of Bills of 
Exchange, Promissory Notes, Bank-notes, and Insurances was 
first published in 1760, and its author was still alive at the 
time of Dawkes.102 But the recent vintage of the work did not, 
apparently, bother Gould, whose response to plaintiff’s 
complaint was to assert that, “Mr. Cunningham’s book was a 
very good book.”103 
De Grey relied far more explicitly on a modern treatise 
in his jury instructions in the case of Sayre v. Rochford in 
1776.104 In October 1775, a successful American banker living in 
London, Stephen Sayre, had been arrested and detained on 
charges of conspiring to overthrow the King.105 An American 
officer serving in the British Army had alerted the Secretary of 
State, Lord Rochford, to the plot. Sayre was released from 
custody after six days for lack of credible evidence, but not 
before Rochford’s officers had searched his house and removed 
his papers.106 Sayre sued for illegal search and seizure and false 
imprisonment, and de Grey presided over the trial.107 A 
transcript of the witness testimony and of counsels’ arguments 
was published at the time, but it excluded the jury 
instructions.108 However, the court reporter, William Blanchard, 
took what appear to be verbatim notes of de Grey’s discussion 
of the law and summation of the facts, and he presented a 
  
 101 Id. at 212. 
 102 TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY 
NOTES, BANK-NOTES, AND INSURANCES (London, W. Owen 1760). Apparently the old 
rule of etiquette that judges may not cite living authors did not extend to counsel. See 
DAWSON, supra note 8, at 97; WILLIAM POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION 
29 (2007). 
 103 Dawkes v. De Lorane, 3 Wils. at 212. A bit later in the argument Gould 
drew support from “a little book called Lex Mercatoria,” id., which could have been 
Gerard Malynes’s oft-reprinted Consuetudo, vel, Lex Mercatoria, first published in 
1622, though at two volumes that was hardly a “little book.” Other possible candidates 
include Giles Jacobs’s 1718 work Lex Mercatoria, or, The Merchant’s Companion and 
Wyndam Beawes’s massive 1752 Lex Mercatoria Rediviva. 
 104 JOSEPH GURNEY, THE TRIAL OF THE CAUSE ON AN ACTION BROUGHT BY 
STEPHEN SAYRE, ESQ. AGAINST THE RIGHT HONOURABLE WILLIAM HENRY EARL OF 
ROCHFORD (London, C. Kearsely 1776). 
 105 A summary of the plot can be found in James Lander, A Tale of Two 
Hoaxes in Britain and France in 1775, 49 HIST. J. 995, 1013-17 (2007). 
 106 Id. 
 107 See generally GURNEY, supra note 104. 
 108 See generally id. 
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clean copy to the Chief Justice as a gift.109 This manuscript is 
extant in the de Grey archives.110 
De Grey, who clearly believed that Rochford should be 
found blameless, took great pains in explaining the controlling 
legal principles to the jury.111 He borrowed the law he applied 
straight from that “very learned & able modern writer,”112 Sir 
Michael Foster (1689-1763), late Justice of the Court of King’s 
Bench and author of a work published in 1762 that combined 
reports of criminal trials with short “discourses” on various 
aspects of criminal law.113 De Grey followed the gist, as well as 
the rhetoric, of Foster’s chapter on “High Treason in 
Compassing the King’s Death.”114 
De Grey instructed the jury, adhering to Foster, that 
intent to imprison the King—supposedly Sayre’s plan—was 
alone sufficient to support a charge of high treason, even if 
mere intent to imprison an ordinary person would not be a 
crime. He continued: 
In the same learned author I mentioned to you before—it is said—
writings not published but found in a mans [sic] Closet may be under 
circumstances evidence of high Treason. Letters & correspondence 
proved to be sent—the sending in such Case is an ouverte Act or the 
Evidence of an Ouverte Act at least that would be high Treason 
connected with the design that I mentioned and used as the Means 
or measure of effectuating the intent—nay that is so far settled in 
Law That Words & Discourse may be evidence of high Treason—may 
be Ouverte Acts of High Treason. And as this is going a great way 
and treading upon very tender ground[,] I would not be content with 
  
 109 On Blanchard see Page Life, Blanchard, William Isaac (bap. 1741?, d. 
1796), in 6 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 152-53. 
The author thanks John Gordan for the information about Blanchard. 
 110 See Transcript of Sayre v. Rochford Jury Instructions, Norfolk Record 
Office, WLS XLIX/3/23. 
 111 In fact, the explanation was probably largely for the benefit of counsel, 
presumably in case they wanted to object in order to reserve a point on error. See, e.g., 
id. fols. 1-2 (de Grey commented, “I am very glad I do this in the presence of the 
Council [sic] on both sides who are almost all of them attend[in]g because I now call 
upon them & desire that if in saying what I apprehend to be the Law they think I am 
mistaken they will tell me so—and I shall be either able to change my opinion or put it 
in a course of inquiry as may be fit and proper for Justice to the partys [sic].”). 
 112 Id. fol. 3. 
 113 See MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE 
COMMISSION OF OYER AND TERMINER AND GOAL DELIVERY FOR THE TRIAL OF THE 
REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746 IN THE COUNTY OF SURRY, AND OF OTHER CROWN CASES 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press 1762). De Grey owned the first edition. See Catalogue of the 
Home Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/4/2, fol. 2. 
 114 Compare, e.g., de Grey’s wording in Transcript of Sayre v. Rochford Jury 
Instructions, Norfolk Record Office, WLS XLIX/3/23, fols. 3-6, with FOSTER, supra note 
113, at 193-96. 
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giving you my opinion without quoting it as the opinion of that great 
Judge who was one of the best wishers to this Government that ever 
sat upon the Bench.115 
Foster was a “great Judge,” who earned the approbation of his 
contemporaries, but he was also a modern writer whose 
statement of the law appeared not in a particular case, nor in a 
collection of case summaries, but in a discussion hung only at a 
remove upon the authority of a judicial opinion, and yet de 
Grey felt not only comfortable but compelled to cite him as an 
authority.116 
What these examples suggest is that the methods of 
judicial education matter. If, for instance, the primary means of 
training new judges comes from the dispensing of wisdom by 
more experienced colleagues, then one might expect to see the 
perpetuation of institutional traditions even beyond their 
usefulness. On the other hand, if judges learned largely from 
books, then the content of those books and the way they 
organized and explained the law would color the judges’ 
understanding and influence their opinions.117 However, such 
influence has not been ascribed to the sorts of practice manuals 
and reference books de Grey purchased. Some of them have 
been written off as no more than textbooks for students or 
young lawyers.118 As a group they have been declared to have 
had limited bearing on the development of the law in the 
eighteenth century.119 The English legal historian, William 
Holdsworth, claimed that barristers did not read practice 
books.120 Perhaps attorneys, those lesser members of the legal 
profession who filed papers and dealt with clients, read such 
books.121 But the more elevated barristers who pleaded in court 
  
 115 Transcript of Sayre v. Rochford Jury Instructions, Norfolk Record Office, 
WLS XLIX/3/23, fols. 5-6 (emphasis added). 
 116 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 30, at 136 & n.6. 
 117 David Ibbetson, Legal Printing and Legal Doctrine, 35 IRISH JURIST 345, 
345 (2000) (“[T]here is a close relationship between the way in which the law operates 
and the sources that are available to the lawyers who operate it.”); Simpson, supra note 
17, at 633 (arguing for a “close relation between the forms of legal literature and 
lawyers’ ideas of what they are doing, and of the appropriate way for jurists to 
behave.”). 
 118 Lobban, supra note 17, at 73 n.20. 
 119 Id. at 70; Simpson, supra note 17, at 639 (ignores practice books, and 
claims that “abridgments and common-place books . . . remained dominant forms of 
legal literature until the nineteenth century”). 
 120 6 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 436-38. 
 121 See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25-28; 12 HOLDSWORTH, 
supra note 30, at 8-9. 
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required skills, such as advocacy and examining witnesses, 
that could only be learned in practice.122 
But a judge needed more than courtroom skills.123 He 
also needed to be familiar with those aspects of law and 
procedure, of which, as a barrister, he might have had only 
glancing knowledge. If he turned to books to acquire that 
knowledge, then those books in part shaped him as a judge. In 
de Grey’s case, the evidence is insufficient to determine how 
the books he may have read formed his jurisprudence. 
However, given how little is known about judicial education 
historically, it is already a step forward even to identify the 
sorts of books a judge used. That is the subject matter of Part 
III. 
III. STAGE ONE OF CHIEF JUSTICE DE GREY’S JUDICIAL 
EDUCATION 
Preserved in the de Grey archives is a letter written on 
Monday, January 21, 1771, addressed to William de Grey from 
Lord North, the prime minister. It informs the then-attorney 
general that, “Lord Chief Justice Wilmot having this evening 
resign’d his office, I am commanded by his Majesty to inform 
you that he has pitched upon you for his successor.”124 The 
appointment was made official on Friday the twenty-fifth, and 
the next day de Grey took the coif as a serjeant-at-law, as was 
a prerequisite for all English common law judges, and was 
  
 122 See 6 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 438 (1924) (“The art 
of examining witnesses, and of presenting the facts in a manner favorable to his client, 
was more important than a minute knowledge of how to put and keep in motion the 
formal machinery of process.”). 
 123 Cf. Letter from William Blackstone to Lord Shelburne (July 29, 1762), 
reprinted in THE LETTERS OF SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 1744-1780, at 93 (W.R. Prest 
ed., 2006) (“My Ambition now rises to the Post of an English Judge; for which I hope 
that my Studies have in some degree qualified me (else I should be ashamed to think of 
it) though I fear that my natural Diffidence will never permit me to make any very 
great Progress at the Bar; for which Talents very different are required than those . . . 
that will qualify for the Bench.”). 
 124 Letter from Lord North to William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS 
XIII/9/3. The letter is not dated. It only indicates that it was written on “Monday 
Night.” However, Wilmot’s resignation was made public by at least Thursday, January 
24, 1771 and de Grey was sworn in on January 26, so the date of the letter can be 
securely identified. 2 W. Bl. 734 (“[O]n January 24th, Sir John Eardley Wilmot (on 
account of ill health) resigned his office . . . .”). The letter continues, “You will know 
better than I do the steps that are proper to take upon this occasion; as Lord Chief 
Justice Wilmot has actually resign’d, it will be right to proceed in them with all 
convenient speed.” 
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sworn in as chief justice of Common Pleas.125 At some point that 
same Saturday he, or someone on his behalf, made a visit to 
the bookshop of Barnes Tovey in Bell Yard, a few blocks from 
de Grey’s house in Lincoln’s Inn Fields.126 From Tovey he 
purchased Robert Richardson’s The Attorney’s Practice in the 
Court of Common Pleas, a primer on Common Pleas procedure 
ostensibly aimed at students and young clerks but apparently 
also of use to neophyte judges.127 
Between February 28 and November 16, 1771, according 
to the receipt from Tovey reproduced on the next page, de Grey 
bought five additional practical pleading or procedure manuals. 
The question is how he used these books. Since he does not cite 
the works in his judicial opinions and since none of his personal 
copies have been located, this is impossible to answer with 
certainty.128 However, the nature of the books themselves, the 
order and timing of his purchases, and several additional 
pieces of evidence concerning his book-buying habits generally 
suggest that he bought the works in order to teach himself 
about his new court and its procedure. 
In all, de Grey obtained eight works from Tovey 
between January 1771 and January 1772, six on pleading and 
procedure and, at the end of the period, two others that did not 
belong to his judicial self-education project: Francis Vesey’s 
reports of Chancery cases from the years 1746-1755 and 
volume three of James Burrow’s King’s Bench reports for the 
years 1761-1766.129 He presumably bought these two reports to 
add to an impressive collection that by 1781 included over 
seventy nominate reports, ten volumes of the Year Books, 
  
 125 2 W. Bl. 734. 
 126 Receipt for Purchases at Barnes Tovey Bookshop, Norfolk Record Office, 
WLS LV/10/25 (Jan. 20, 1772). On the location of Tovey’s bookshop in 1771, see the 
title page to his edition of the Crown Circuit Companion, listing his shop at “the Dove, 
in Bell-Yard, near Lincoln’s Inn.” W. STUBBS & G. TALMASH, CROWN CIRCUIT 
COMPANION (London, J. Worrall & B. Tovey, 4th ed. 1768). De Grey lived in Lincoln’s 
Inn Fields, just outside of Lincoln’s Inn. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 68, at 413. 
 127 Lobban, supra note 17, at 73 n.20. 
 128 According to de Grey’s descendant, the ninth Baron Walsingham (de Grey 
was the first baron), the library remained in the family intact until it was dispersed 
through a sale in the late 1960s or early 1970s. No catalogue or record of the sale has 
been located. E-mail from Lord John Walsingham to Emily Kadens, Assistant Professor 
of Law, University of Texas at Austin (July 22, 2008, 21:15 CST) (on file with author). 
 129 See 3 JAMES BURROW, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF 
KING’S BENCH SINCE THE TIME OF LORD MANSFIELD’S COMING TO PRESIDE IN IT 
(London, J. Worrall & B. Tovey, 2d ed. 1771); FRANCIS VESEY, CASES ARGUED AND 
DETERMINED, IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY, IN THE TIME OF LORD CHANCELLOR 
HARDWICKE, FROM THE YEAR 1746-7, TO 1755 (London, T. Cadell 1771). 
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assorted other collections of cases, and seventeen volumes of 
reports in manuscript.130 Burrow and Vesey both reported 
decisions from important judges, respectively Lord Mansfield 
and Chancellor Hardwicke, so it is no surprise that de Grey 
would have wanted to own the works. Furthermore, the timing 
of the purchases can likely be accounted for at least in part by 
the fact that both volumes were published in 1771, the Vesey in 
January and the Burrow as a second edition put out by Tovey 
and his partner John Worrall in mid-November, just a few days 
before de Grey obtained it.131 
 
Receipt for the Purchase of Law Books. Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/10/25, 
428X2. Reprinted by courtesy of the Norfolk Record Office, Norwich, England. 
  
 130 Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS 
L/4/1, fols. 1, 2-4; Catalogue of Home Library of William de Grey, WLS L/4/2, fol. 7. 
 131 See Advertisement for the Burrow Volume, PUB. ADVERTISER, Nov. 11, 
1771, at 1. The Vesey volumes appear to have been published in January 1771 by 
Thomas Cadell. The price listed in the advertisement is the same as that paid by de 
Grey in January 1772. See Advertisement for the Vesey Volume, PUB. ADVERTISER, 
June 6, 1771, at 1; Advertisement for the Vesey Volume, PUB. ADVERTISER, Jan. 31, 
1771, at 3. 
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That leaves the six works on procedure. These fall 
neatly into two types. In one category are three basic 
procedural primers, aimed primarily at solicitors. In the second 
category are three more works that, due to tradition or the 
esteem in which their authors were held, had acquired 
sufficient authority to be cited in court. Nonetheless, these still 
had the characteristics of textbooks or reference manuals, 
albeit respectable ones. 
A. Procedural Primers 
To begin with the category of procedural primers, as 
mentioned above, de Grey acquired the first book on the list, 
Richardson’s Attorney’s Practice in the Common Pleas, the day 
he became a judge.132 One month later, on February 28, two 
weeks after the end of his first term,133 he purchased Joseph 
Harrison’s Present Practice of the Court of Common Pleas.134 
The two books are virtually indistinguishable. Indeed, the 
Harrison was largely a bowdlerized version of the Richardson. 
They would have been ideal introductory or refresher 
“nutshells” for a new judge who had spent most of the prior two 
decades in Chancery and eight years serving in high 
government offices far removed from mundane common law 
practice. 
Practice books such as these two appear to have been 
directed at the paper-filing attorneys rather than barristers. As 
such, they focused on the practical procedure of the courts, 
pleading technique, fee structures, and model forms.135 Such 
information was of obvious use to de Grey, for, although he had 
practiced a certain amount in King’s Bench (though, of course, 
not Common Pleas), he was unlikely to have retained an 
intimate knowledge of whatever arcane details of common law 
procedure that he might once have mastered. 
Perhaps even more usefully, the long initial chapter in 
each work described the officers and machinery of the Court. 
This served two purposes for de Grey. First, it was a quick 
introduction—conveniently including name, position, and job 
  
 132 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 133 Hilary term ended on February 12. See PUB. ADVERTISER, Jan. 29, 1771, at 3. 
 134 See Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, 
WLS L/4/1, fol. 7. He also bought Harrison’s PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF 
KING’S BENCH; both Harrison volumes were published in 1761. The Richardson edition 
he purchased was published in 1769. See id. 
 135 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 122, at 437-48. 
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description—to his Court employees. Obtaining this 
information furthered a crucial element of his socialization, 
namely, learning his way around the organization.136 Second, 
more crassly, the chapters informed him which of the Court’s 
bureaucratic positions were under his patronage, this being a 
significant source of a chief’s income.137 
The case reports provide an inkling that de Grey needed 
to upgrade his knowledge of procedure. In two early cases, he 
demonstrated himself to be a bit at sea with the procedural 
question before the Court. In Long v. Linch, heard during de 
Grey’s first term, the plaintiff had sued the defendant for a 
debt, and in order to hold defendant to bail, had filed an 
affidavit.138 Defendant argued that plaintiff should have made a 
positive oath of the debt, and that an affidavit “only of mere 
inference and conclusion” was insufficient.139 Gould and Nares 
disagreed.140 Blackstone dissented, probably correctly.141 
Blackstone records de Grey as “dubitante.”142 The following 
term, in April 1771, Common Pleas heard a habeas corpus 
petition by the Lord Mayor of London, Brass Crosby, who had 
been ordered imprisoned by the Speaker of the House of 
Commons for violating the parliamentary privilege of a House 
officer.143 The wily serjeants who argued the case ex parte on 
behalf of the Mayor initiated the proceedings by moving to 
have the return of the writ read then tried to maneuver the 
court into admitting that errors in the return should result in 
their client’s discharge.144 De Grey became quite embroiled in 
the dispute, demanding to see the writ and the return, which 
  
 136 See Wasby, supra note 2, at 10 (“[New judges] must learn to deal with 
court staff, both lawyers and non-lawyers—in short, the court bureaucracy.”). 
 137 DUMAN, supra note 10, at 112, 120. 
 138 Long v. Linch, (1771) 2 W. Bl. 740, 740. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 740 & n.p (Elsley ed., 1828) (reviewing the development of the case 
law on the issue). 
 142 Id. at 740. Wilson’s report of the case has de Grey agreeing with the 
majority. Long v. Linch, 3 Wils. 154, 154. 
 143 The situation arose when Norton issued a warrant for the arrest of John 
Miller, printer of the London Evening Post, for printing the debates of the House of 
Commons. In the 1771 “Printers’ Case,” Parliament and the London printers disputed 
the right to print the debates of the House of Commons, with the House asserting its 
privilege of secrecy of debate. The background to the Common Pleas case is described 
in ARTHUR H. CASH, JOHN WILKES: THE SCANDALOUS FATHER OF CIVIL LIBERTY 277-85 
(2006). See also G. F. R. Barker, rev. S. J. Skedd, Crosby, Brass (1725-1793), in 14 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 410. 
 144 Postscript, MIDDLESEX J., Apr. 20, 1771, at 3. 
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“he perused . . . with great attention.”145 Gould and Blackstone 
eventually had to steer the neophyte chief out of trouble and 
move the case beyond the procedural hurdle.146 
The fifth purchase de Grey made from Tovey, on July 
11, was also an attorney’s practice book, but this time the work, 
The Crown Circuit Companion,147 concerned trial procedure on 
circuit rather than the procedure of the Court sitting en banc in 
Westminster. According to newspaper reports, de Grey left for 
his first assize three days after buying the book.148 
He may have made this purchase because he felt some 
trepidation about sitting on assize. He would have had little 
recent circuit experience, as he likely had not gone a full assize 
circuit as a barrister for many years. For one thing, Chancery 
barristers often could not go on assize because Chancery did 
not cease its work during the months when the common law 
courts in Westminster shut down so that the judges could go on 
circuit.149 Second, the solicitor general and attorney general 
generally did not go on circuit. In a big trial, they might be 
called in on the brief, but then they would not have had to 
occupy themselves with routine or technical matters.150 
  
 145 Id. 
 146 Id.; see also Pole v. Jonson, (1771) 2 W. Bl. 774, 766 (heard during de 
Grey’s third term, in which he gave the opinion of the Court and was promptly put in 
his place by his three puisnes, who announced that, though they “agreed, that the 
judgment should be for the defendant, [they] thought the rule laid down by the Chief 
Justice too lax and general, and introductive of infinite litigations”).  
 147 W. STUBBS & G. TALMASH, THE CROWN CIRCUIT COMPANION; CONTAINING 
THE PRACTICE OF THE ASSISES ON THE CROWN SIDE, AND OF THE COURTS OF GENERAL 
AND GENERAL QUARTER SESSIONS OF THE PEACE: WHEREIN IS INCLUDED, A COLLECTION 
OF USEFUL AND MODERN PRECEDENTS OF INDICTMENTS IN CRIMINAL CASES; AS WELL AT 
COMMON LAW, AS THOSE CREATED BY STATUTE (London, J. Worrall & B. Tovey 4th ed. 
1768).  
 148 London, GAZETTEER & NEW DAILY ADVERTISER, July 13, 1771, at 2; Norfolk 
Gaol Book, National Archives, ASSI 33/5, fol. 37 (listing de Grey and Adams as hearing 
suits). De Grey apparently did not go the Lent 1771 circuit. Although the Middlesex 
Journal of March 2, at page 1, reported that de Grey had set out for the Norfolk circuit 
during the Lent assize of 1771, he is not listed in the assize record for the circuit, and 
on March 6, the Public Advertiser noted at page 2 that, “Lord Chief Justice De Grey is 
at this Time so severely afflicted with the Gout as to be incapable of all Business.” See 
Norfolk Gaol Book, National Archives, ASSI 33/5, fol. 15 (listing Adams and Serjeant 
Whitaker as hearing cases). However, de Grey’s papers do include an account for this 
assize. Accounts for Lent Assize 1771, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/9/14. This might 
just reflect the share of the cut he received as Chief Justice. 
 149 LEMMINGS, supra note 10, at 184. 
 150 1 TWISS, supra note 15, at 189 (“It is usual for a barrister, advanced to the 
rank of a law officer of the Crown, to quit his circuit and confine himself to the business 
of London, except when taken on special retainer to lead some particular cause at the 
assizes.”). 
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To assuage his anxiety, de Grey presumably could rely 
on two sources of education. First, he went the circuit with Sir 
Richard Adams, baron of the Exchequer.151 Adams had been 
appointed to the bench in 1753, making him at that time one of 
the longest-serving central court judges and therefore perhaps 
a very good person to mentor the neophyte.152 However, on 
circuit the judges presided individually, usually with one judge 
hearing the civil suits and the other concurrently hearing the 
criminal cases.153 Thus, de Grey was on his own in open court, 
which might explain why, shortly before the assize, he bought a 
reference book. 
The Companion was part description of the circuit 
proceedings, part form book, and part fee schedule. The first 
section of the work briefed the reader on the details of the 
assize trial process: when things happened, which court officers 
did and said what, which forms had to be filed at different 
points in the process and what they said, and similar steps in 
the process. This was followed by model indictments for dozens 
of crimes and then an explanation of which fees were received 
by each court officer. If de Grey wanted to remind himself 
about the most basic choreography of the assize he could have 
obtained that information from this book. And if he wanted to 
look over the forms of indictments or the criminal procedure, he 
could do that too. This might have been especially useful for 
him because he had probably seen little routine criminal law 
since he had been a young barrister, if he had even then. 
In his Commentaries, Blackstone indicated that books 
like the Harrison, the Richardson, and the Companion had a 
genuine role to play in teaching about court procedure. He 
instructed those students who wished to gain a deeper 
knowledge of procedure that “[a] book or two of technical 
learning will also be found very convenient . . . . These books of 
practice, as they are called, are all pretty much on a level in 
point of composition and solid instruction; so that which bears 
the latest edition is usually the best.”154 De Grey had certainly 
  
 151 Norfolk Gaol Book, National Archives, ASSI 33/5, fol. 37. 
 152 According to de Grey’s predecessor as Chief Justice, Sir John Eardley 
Wilmot, Adams “was a very good Lawyer, and an excellent Judge, having every quality 
necessary to dignify that character: I never saw him out of humour in my life, and I 
knew him intimately for forty years.” JOHN WILMOT, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF THE 
RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR JOHN EARDLEY WILMOT, KNT. 199-200 (London, White & 
Cochrane 2d ed. 1811) (internal quotations omitted). 
 153 1 OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 15, at 134-35. 
 154 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *271 n.(a). 
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known Blackstone before joining the bench, for they had been 
in Parliament together and had been opposing counsel on 
several cases in the 1760s.155 De Grey must also have known 
that Blackstone, author of the already famous Commentaries 
on the Laws of England, knew books.156 Indeed, only three years 
earlier, in the third volume of the Commentaries, Blackstone 
had published his own well-regarded 155-page mini-treatise on 
(primarily) Common Pleas procedure.157 Thus, one might 
wonder whether, upon joining the Court, de Grey had sought 
from Blackstone advice about useful reference books and 
whether Blackstone had given the Chief the same advice about 
practice manuals that he had offered to his students. 
B. Authoritative Works 
Two of the books de Grey bought that fell into the 
second category, that of works authoritative enough to be cited 
in court, concerned pleading. Pleading had, in the previous 
centuries, become an excessively technical system, and one 
which skillful advocates could use to prevent the court from 
getting to the merits.158 As a Chancery barrister, this was 
probably yet another common law skill at which de Grey was 
pretty rusty. The extent to which he felt it important to learn 
about pleading can be seen in the information provided on 
Tovey’s receipt about de Grey’s third purchase, on March 25, of 
volume five of John Comyns’s Digest of the Laws of England. 
The Digest was a popular legal encyclopedia, in which the rules 
of law and the relevant cases and statutes were collected under 
alphabetically-organized general headings and subheadings. 
The work had originally been written in French but was 
translated into English and published posthumously in five 
  
 155 In Lowe v. Joliffe, (1762) 1 W. Bl. 365 (K.B.), Blackstone was on the brief 
for plaintiff, de Grey for the defendant; in Baskett v. Cunningham, (1762) 1 W. Bl. 370 
(Ch.), de Grey was on the brief for the plaintiff, Blackstone for the defendant; in 
Torriano v. Legge, (1763) 1 W. Bl. 420 (Exch.), Blackstone was on brief for the plaintiff, 
de Grey for defendant; and in King v. University of Cambridge, (1765) 1 W. Bl. 547 
(K.B.), de Grey moved for plaintiff in his role as solicitor general, Blackstone was on 
the brief for the University. Obviously there may have been other cases, but these are 
the cases that a search of the published reports turns up. 
 156 WILFRID R. PREST, WILLIAM BLACKSTONE: LAW AND LETTERS IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 220-21 (2008) (discussing reception of the Commentaries). 
 157 Id. at 221; see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *270-425. 
 158 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 308-10, 314-15 (3d ed. 
1926) [hereinafter HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY]. 
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volumes between 1762 and 1767.159 De Grey owned the first 
edition of the whole five-volume set, and, given the importance 
of the Comyns as a reference, he probably had added it to his 
library as soon as it came out.160 
In purchasing only volume five in 1771, de Grey had 
something special in mind. He bought the volume unbound (“in 
sheets”) and then had the 300-page-long first heading or title, 
“Pleader,” separately bound in vellum.161 Comyns (c. 1667-
1740), a serjeant practicing before Common Pleas, and later a 
judge on that Court and on Exchequer, had been particularly 
knowledgeable about the rules of pleading.162 The title “Pleader” 
was “exceptionally well developed” and authoritative.163 The 
Comyns also was, as a dense, encyclopedic compendium of case 
law on every conceivable issue that could arise on a given legal 
subject, very much a reference manual.164 The fact that de Grey 
went to the expense of possibly purchasing a duplicate of a 
volume he already owned and of having the single title 
separately bound, indicates that he believed this was a 
reference work to which he would be referring repeatedly, 
either for its own information or as an index to the relevant 
case law.165 
  
 159 M. Macnair, Comyns, Sir John (c. 1667-1740), in 12 OXFORD DICTIONARY 
OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 910-11. 
 160 Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS 
L/4/1, fol. 1. There is no record of his purchasing the whole set while on the bench. 
 161 Read the receipt: “Doing up [the] Title, ‘Pleader,’ of Ditto in Vellum.” 
Interestingly, the Cambridge bookseller, John Woodyer, hired to make a list of de 
Grey’s law books in November 1781, soon after de Grey retired from the bench, did not 
understand what the Pleader volume was. The catalogue lists the book as “The Pleader 
a Law Book unfinishd [sic] & without a Title.” Catalogue of Law Library of William de 
Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/4/1, cover page & fol. 1. 
 162 M. Macnair, Comyns, Sir John (c. 1667-1740), in 12 OXFORD DICTIONARY 
OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 910. 
 163 Id. at 911; see W.S. HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES AND LITERATURE OF ENGLISH 
LAW 118-19 (1925) [hereinafter HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES]; 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY, 
supra note 158, at 312 (quoting Serjeant Stephen calling the Comyns title on pleader “a 
more systematic compilation upon this subject than had previously appeared” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 164 Baloch, supra note 93, at 420 (quoting a letter from an eighteenth-century 
law clerk stating that reading the Comyns “would prove but a dull task as he does not 
preserve a connected style and besides might give you a distaste for study” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 165 The library catalogue does not indicate whether volume five of the set was 
incomplete, and there is no mention of an additional volume five. However, the Pleader 
volume is listed in the catalogue immediately before the Comyns is listed, so they were 
likely shelved together. Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record 
Office, WLS LV/4/1, fol. 1. It is possible that de Grey bought a new volume five just so 
that he could have the title “Pleader” bound as a separate reference work. 
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The last book on de Grey’s list, acquired on November 
16, 1771, also concerned pleading. The anonymous A System of 
Pleading consisted of the first English translation, reworking, 
and updating of a well-known seventeenth-century law French 
work by Samson Eure called the Doctrina Placitandi, or the art 
and science of pleading.166 The English legal historian, William 
Holdsworth, noted that the Doctrina Placitandi was “[o]ne of 
the earliest” systematic works on pleading,167 and in 1759 John 
Willes, Chief Justice of Common Pleas, announced in court that 
there was “more law and learning in Doctrina Placitandi than 
in any book he knew.”168 De Grey did not seem to own the 
Doctrina, and he may have bought the System of Pleading 
when he did because it had been published in July 1771.169 
However, coupled with the Comyns, the purchase suggests that 
this clear and informative overview on the method and tactics 
of successful pleading could have been standing in for the sort 
of oral instruction Justice Denison gave to Mansfield and 
Ryder. De Grey may have had nowhere else to turn. Gould had 
been an apparently quite average barrister;170 Blackstone was 
renowned as a weak advocate;171 and Nares, though an 
experienced courtroom lawyer, may not have impressed de 
Grey with his judicial abilities.172 
On June 25, de Grey purchased his fourth book, 
Geoffrey Gilbert’s The History and Practice of Civil Actions, 
Particularly in the Court of Common Pleas.173 The Gilbert was a 
standard work by an eighteenth-century judge and prolific 
writer of elementary texts, whose posthumously-published 
treatises enjoyed great popularity.174 It was, as Blackstone said, 
“a book of a very different stamp [from other practice books]; 
it . . . traced out the reason of many parts of our modern 
  
 166 SAMSON EURE, DOCTRINA PLACITANDI, OU L’ART & SCIENCE DE BON 
PLEADING (London, Robert Pawlet 1677). 
 167 HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES, supra note 163, at 118. 
 168 White v. Willis, (1759) 2 Wils. 87, 88 (K.B.). 
 169 See LONDON EVENING POST, June 22, 1771, at 4 (printing advertisements 
announcing the forthcoming publication of the System of Pleading); see also LONDON 
EVENING POST, July 6, 1771, at 4 (announcing the publication). 
 170 See supra notes 89-90. 
 171 See Kadens, supra note 89. 
 172 See supra note 60. 
 173 De Grey purchased the second edition published in 1761. The first edition 
appeared in 1737. Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, 
WLS L/4/1, fol. 7. 
 174 Michael Macnair, Sir Jeffrey Gilbert and His Treatises, 15 J. LEGAL HIST. 
252, 258, 260-61 (1994). 
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practice, from the feudal institutions and the primitive 
construction of our courts, in a most clear and ingenious 
manner.”175 This historical approach may have appealed to de 
Grey, whose library and opinions demonstrate his interest in 
history.176 But on another level, the Gilbert may have offered to 
de Grey, an interloper of sorts in the Common Pleas, a means 
to a greater sense of legitimacy. By learning about the history 
of the Court and the development of its procedure, he could also 
place himself in that story. It made him less of an outsider and 
helped him understand the reason for the procedures he was 
now obligated to continue. In the parlance of modern studies of 
judicial education, he was socializing himself to his new role by 
seeking “to find some sense of fit with the court organization.”177 
More pragmatically, the Gilbert was worth having 
because it was a respectable enough authority to be cited in 
court. Justice Blackstone referred to the book in an opinion in 
1775 to state a rule on venue;178 and defense counsel in 1772 
relied on it for a rule concerning the actions that could be 
joined in a single declaration.179 Defense counsel also used the 
book in 1776 alongside more traditional authorities such as 
Brooke’s and Rolle’s Abridgments to make a point about local 
custom;180 and in the same term plaintiff’s counsel adduced it as 
the source of a rule about the proper place to make a plea to 
  
 175 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *271 n.(a). 
 176 De Grey owned a remarkable variety of historical works, ranging from 
William Wotton’s History of Rome (1701), to David Jones’s Compleat History of the 
Turks (1701), to Michel Le Vassor’s ten-volume Histoire du regne de Louis XIII, roi de 
France et de Navarre (1760), to, of course, Sir Matthew Hale’s History of the Common 
Law (1739). Catalogue of the Home Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, 
WLS LV/4/2, fols. 13, 24; Catalogue of the Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk 
Record Office, WLS LV/4/1, fol. 8 (Hale). His opinions, too, demonstrate an interest in 
history where that was called for. In Wood’s Case, 2 W. Bl. 745, 745, heard during his 
first month on the bench, he “expressed his Surprize” at the claim that Common Pleas 
had no jurisdiction to grant a writ of habeas corpus at common law. To answer this 
assertion, de Grey examined the legal history, using cases and treatises, to 
demonstrate the origin of this belief and to prove its falsity. In Rowning v. Goodchild, 
(1773) 2 W. Bl. 906, 908-09, he deployed historical sources to interpret the meaning of 
the word “delivery” in one of the early statutes related to the post office. And in Bolts v. 
Purvis, (1775) 2 W. Bl. 1023, 1026-27, he examined the history of the law governing the 
East-India trade. Another case in which de Grey used historical analysis was Barker v. 
Braham, (1773) 2 W. Bl. 869, 871 (history of law of set off).  
 177 Alpert, Atkins & Ziller, supra note 2, at 329-30; Wasby, supra note 2, at 10 
(“Appellate judges must become acclimated to their jobs. They must . . . learn formal 
rules of the court and its informal norms, including the court’s history and traditions.”). 
 178 Santler v. Heard, (1775) 2 W. Bl. 1031, 1033. 
 179 Mast v. Goodson, (1772) 2 W. Bl. 848, 849. 
 180 Mayor of Berwick v. Ewart, (1776) 2 W. Bl. 1068, 1069. 
2009] THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL EDUCATION 177 
the jurisdiction.181 In other words, this was a book with which 
de Grey was going to come into contact in court, which 
increases the likelihood that he bought it to read or consult. 
Furthermore, the fact that de Grey did not already own such a 
standard work is arguably evidence of how little he had 
concerned himself with Common Pleas procedure prior to his 
elevation to the bench. 
C. Evidence of Self-Study 
Although, based on his library catalogues, de Grey 
appears to have had a lifelong habit of collecting books on 
subjects about which his schooling, career, or merely personal 
interest demanded that he be familiar, it is unlikely that he 
purchased the books on Tovey’s receipt from mere bibliophilic 
interest.182 First, he kept them in his law library with what was 
evidently his active reference collection. Second, the other 
additions he made to his law library during his tenure on the 
bench did not have the coherence of the 1771 acquisitions. 
Between de Grey’s accounts and his library catalogues, several 
purchases can be identified. He added three volumes of reports 
on King’s Bench and Exchequer, the 1772 second edition of 
Henry Barnes’s Notes of Cases in Points of Practice Taken in 
the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster, John Lilly’s 
Practical Register, the 1777 edition of Joseph Sayer’s Law of 
Costs to go with the 1768 first edition he also owned, and a 
volume of the laws of the province of Quebec.183 While on the 
bench, de Grey may also have obtained the first edition of 
  
 181 Grant v. Lord Sondes, (1776) 2 W. Bl. 1094, 1095. 
 182 See VIRGINIA F. STERN, GABRIEL HARVEY: HIS LIFE, MARGINALIA AND 
LIBRARY 194 (1979) (“The titles in an individual’s library are usually an excellent 
indicator of his interests.”). 
 183 King’s Bench reports by Sayer (1775), Catalogue of Law Library of William 
de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/4/1, fol. 2; the just-published volume four of 
Burrow’s King’s Bench reports, Record of Purchase, Burrow’s Reports, Norfolk Record 
Office, WLS LV/13/14 (June 24, 1776); Exchequer Reports by Chief Baron Parker 
(1776), Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS 
LV/4/1, fol. 2; Barnes’s Notes, Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk 
Record Office, WLS L/4/1, fol. 6; the 1735 edition of Lilly’s Practical Register, Record of 
Purchase, Lilly’s Practical Register, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/14/13 (Jan. 15, 
1777); Sayer’s Law of Costs (1777), Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, 
Norfolk Record Office, WLS L/4/1, fol. 6. He appears to have had a special interest in 
Quebec. Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS 
L/4/1, fol. 1. He had three more such volumes in his home library (a work on the custom 
of the French in the Province of Quebec also published in 1772 and two copies of a 
“Code of Laws for Quebeck” published in 1774). Catalogue of Home Library of William 
de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS L/4/2, fols. 3, 22. 
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Blackstone’s Commentaries that he kept in his law library.184 
Finally, as will be discussed at length in the next section, in 
1772, he bought Buller’s Law of Trials at Nisi Prius. 
The third piece of evidence suggesting that de Grey 
bought the procedural works in 1771 as part of a methodical 
campaign to educate himself in the practice of Common Pleas 
is the fact that he did not immediately acquire the standard 
collections of Common Pleas cases. Coming in, case law was 
probably not his foremost concern. As the twentieth-century 
Canadian judge, Edson Haines, said in an article on judicial 
education: 
[S]ubstantive law will be recalled and learned as [the new judge] 
matures on the bench. He can take time to consider this and 
refurbish his knowledge. He cannot postpone the learning of the 
rules by which causes are tried and evidence admitted. The 
guarantees of a fair trial are found in the laws of procedure and 
evidence.185 
As an experienced barrister, de Grey must have had a nearly 
encyclopedic knowledge of cases, albeit predominantly those 
decided in King’s Bench.186 He owned the primary seventeenth 
and early eighteenth-century Common Pleas reports as well as 
a collection of (unidentifiable) manuscript reports, but the 
records give no indication of when he obtained them, and none 
of the receipts or accounts from the 1770s records the purchase 
  
 184 According to his library catalogues, he eventually possessed two complete 
sets of the Commentaries. In his law library, he had the first edition of 1765-1769. 
Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/4/1, fol. 
6. At home he had the pirated Dublin 1775 edition. Catalogue of Home Library of 
William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/4/2, fol. 20. However, his papers also 
contain two receipts for the purchase of the Commentaries. One, from February 12, 
1777, notes that he “paid Mr. Chamberlayne for Blackstone Commtries 0:6:6;” and the 
second records a purchase from the publisher in 1774. Record of Purchase, Lilly’s 
Practical Register, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/14/13 (Jan. 15, 1777); Record of 
Purchase, Blackstone’s Commentaries, WLS LV/12/11 (May 17, 1774); see also Record 
of Payment, Binding of Blackstone’s Commentaries 1774, Norfolk Record Office, WLS 
LV/12/21 (July 5, 1774); Record of Payment, Binding of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 
Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/14/20 (June 4, 1777). The question is to which editions 
these receipts refer, if either. 
 185 Haines, supra note 13, at 233. 
 186 He was also said to have possessed an excellent memory. 1 TWISS, supra 
note 15, at 113 (Lord Eldon said he had a “‘most extraordinary power of memory.’—
‘Lord Chief Justice De Grey,’ said Lord Eldon, ‘was a severe sufferer from gout. I have 
seen him come into court with both hands wrapped in flannel. He could not take a note, 
and had no one to do so for him. I have known him try a cause that lasted nine or ten 
hours, and then, from memory, sum up all the evidence with the greatest correctness. I 
have known counsel interrupt him in his summing up, and represent that he had mis-
stated evidence. ‘I am right,’ he would say, ‘I am sure I am right; refer to your short-
hand writer’s notes.’ He invariably proved to be correct.’”). 
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of Common Pleas reports.187 Yet he did not include in his 1771 
buying spree either the first edition of Henry Barnes’s Notes on 
Common Pleas cases or George Cooke’s Reports and Cases of 
Practice in the Court of Common Pleas, both of which were 
cited regularly by the serjeants in oral argument. At some 
point de Grey did acquire the second, expanded edition of the 
Barnes, though there is no record in his accounts of the 
purchase, and it is possible he received it as a gift from the 
author, who was an officer of the Court.188 The Cooke, however, 
never appeared in either his purchase receipts or his library 
catalogues. 
De Grey may not have worried a great deal about 
knowing the Common Pleas precedents for two reasons. First, 
counsel and the judges often cited King’s Bench cases in their 
argument and opinions.189 This may have been due to King’s 
Bench’s greater prestige, or it may simply have been a result of 
the comparative lack of published Common Pleas reports.190 
Second, the judges and barristers worked together to find the 
relevant cases and discussed them at the hearings, so that any 
lacunae in de Grey’s knowledge could have been addressed in 
this give and take.191 
However, when presiding on circuit, de Grey could not 
dodge substantive questions, so after squaring away his 
  
 187 Catalogue of Home Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, 
WLS L/4/2, fol. 7 (“Seventeen Vols of Reports in MS”—notably, kept in his home 
library).  
 188 Catalogue of Law Library of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS 
L/4/1, fol. 6 (listing the Barnes in the law library catalogue). Barnes was a Secondary 
and Clerk of Errors in the Court of Common Pleas. 
 189 Looking at the twelve cases from Blackstone’s Reports in which de Grey is 
recorded as giving the greatest number of citations, references to King’s Bench cases 
outnumber those to Common Pleas by more than two to one. The cases sampled were: 
Wood’s Case, (1771) 2 W. Bl. 745, 745; Atkinson v. Teasdale, (1772) 2 W. Bl. 817, 818-
20; Hitchin v. Campbell, (1772) 2 W. Bl. 827, 829-32; Parsons v. Lloyd, (1772) 2 W. Bl. 
845, 846-47; Powel v. Milbank, (1772) 2 W. Bl. 851, 852-53; Murray v. Harding, (1773) 
2 W. Bl. 859, 862-86; Barker v. Braham (1773) 2 W. Bl. 866, 867-69; Doe d. Wightwick 
v. Truby, (1774) 2 W. Bl. 944, 946-47; Abbott v. Smith, (1774) 2 W. Bl. 947, 949-51; 
Hawkins v. Plomer, (1776) 2 W. Bl. 1048, 1049-50; Miller v. Seare, (1777) 2 W. Bl. 
1140, 1144-46; Cameron v. Lightfoot, (1778) 2 W. Bl. 1190, 1192-95. 
 190 Oldham, Underreported and Underrated, supra note 50, at 119-21. De Grey 
also seems to have known many decisions from the 1740s and early 1750s by John 
Willes, Chief Justice of Common Pleas from 1737-1761, because he cites them in the 
annotations to his Buller’s Nisi Prius.  
 191 Counsel seems to have been expected to produce case reports at argument. 
See, for example, the statement of counsel in the trial of Fabrigas v. Mostyn (1773), in 
11 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON 
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 169 (Francis Hargrave ed., 4th ed. 1781) (“I 
have Sir Bartholomew Shower’s parliamentary cases upon the table.”). 
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knowledge of pleading and procedure, he turned to the rules of 
law. The next Part examines how he did this. 
IV. STAGE TWO: CREATING A BENCH BOOK 
One of the educational services the Federal Judicial 
Center provides to new federal judges is a bench book tailored 
to the law and procedure of their type of court and distributed 
in a three-ring binder to facilitate updating and 
supplementing.192 Even judges who do not need to make use of 
the supplied bench book end up writing their own checklists, 
notes, and cheat-sheets.193 Not having the benefit of a pre-made 
guidebook to the job of a Common Pleas judge, de Grey created 
his own. And much like modern judges might do with the 
supplied bench book, he began with a printed text and built 
onto it an extensive structure of additions and annotations that 
would make the final work useful to him. His choice of base 
text was the 1772 edition of the Introduction to the Law 
Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius, by Francis Buller, a precocious, 
brilliant, and successful young barrister who would soon 
become the youngest judge to be appointed to the Court of 
King’s Bench.194 
That work, popular enough to be published repeatedly 
until 1817,195 contained a summary of the law encountered at 
civil trials on assize (so-called nisi prius trials). It consisted of 
seven parts covering, first, injuries to the person, to personal 
property, and to real property, then a long section on actions on 
contract, followed by a series of brief accounts of actions given 
by statute, criminal prosecutions relative to civil rights, and 
traverses to land titles and stays of proceedings in lower 
courts.196 The last two parts concerned trial practice, with an 
  
 192 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 
(5th ed. 2007) (“[T]he purpose of . . . the Benchbook . . . is to provide a quick, practical 
guide to help judges with situations they are likely to encounter on the bench . . . . New 
judges in particular should benefit from the Benchbook . . . .”). 
 193 Carp & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 383. I thank Judge Sam Sparks (W.D. 
Tex.) and Judge Lee Rosenthal (S.D. Tex.) for discussing with me the material they 
created when they took the bench. 
 194 LEMAN THOMAS REDE, STRICTURES ON THE LIVES AND CHARACTERS OF THE 
MOST EMINENT LAWYERS OF THE PRESENT DAY 108-09 (London, G. Kearsley 1790); 
James Oldham, Buller, Sir Francis, First Baronet (1746-1800), in 8 OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 617-18. 
 195 James Oldham, Buller, Sir Francis, First Baronet (1746-1800), in 8 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at 617-18. 
 196 See FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS 
AT NISI PRIUS (London, C. Bathurst 1772). The “Actions given by Statute” include 
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extensive treatment of evidence preceding a miscellany of 
“General Matters relative to Trials.” 
The Nisi Prius was the logical book for de Grey to 
choose. Buller described it in the preface to his sixth edition as 
“a vade mecum on the circuits,” intended to provide 
practitioners with a mobile law library containing much of 
what they needed to get through assize trials.197 At least some 
late eighteenth-century lawyers took him at his word. Copies 
survive with blank pages interleaved with the text and bound 
in leather with large flaps that tied over the book to protect the 
pages and keep out the dust of the road. On the blank pages 
the owners made notes on existing precedent, added new law, 
and reported on trials they attended.198 For them, the Buller 
was a storage site for nisi prius law. On the other hand, Isaac 
Espinasse, who later wrote a competing guide to nisi prius law, 
took issue with the claim that Buller’s work was an aid for 
experienced practitioners. Instead, he said, “it was certainly 
used by the younger part of the Profession for a very different 
purpose: it was used by them as an Elementary Book on the 
Law of Nisi Prius, as a necessary Volume of preparatory legal 
information.”199 For de Grey, the Buller may have served as 
both elementary guide and reference library. Either way, he 
made the book his own. In a manner far more extensive than 
the interleaved lawyers’ copies and unusually invasive of the 
author’s text, de Grey reconstructed Buller’s book, adding 
pages of new material and hundreds of marginal annotations to 
turn his own copy into something quite different from the 
original. 
By the time he purchased the Buller around December 
1772,200 Chief Justice de Grey had presided over at most two 
assizes in the country and several sets of trials for London.201 
  
actions upon the statute of hue and cry, id. at 180-83, and actions on the statute of 5 
Eliz. governing apprenticeships, id. at 188-90. The section on “criminal Prosecutions 
relative to Civil Rights” concerns writs of mandamus and quo warranto. Id. at 195-209. 
Traverses to land titles was a method of proving possession of land against the King.  
 197 FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT 
NISI PRIUS, at first page of the unpaginated “Advertisement” (London, R. Pheney 
1793). 
 198 BAKER & TAUSSIG, supra note 94, at 80, 106 (mss. 217, 218, 278). 
 199 ISAAC ESPINASSE, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ACTIONS AND TRIALS AT NISI 
PRIUS, at vi (London, T. Cadell 2d ed. 1793). 
 200 See infra note 243 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dating. 
 201 He did not go on the Lent 1772 circuit according to the Norfolk Gaol Book, 
National Archives, ASSI 33/5, fol. 63, even though he was scheduled to go, MIDDLESEX 
J., Feb. 4, 1772, at 3. For Summer 1772, he was scheduled for the Midland Circuit. 
GEN. EVENING POST, June 25, 1772, at 1. 
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Thus, although he did not yet have a great deal of trial 
experience, he presumably had some idea of the sorts of law he 
would encounter and the sorts of reference material that would 
be helpful to have at hand. He knew, for instance, that 
presiding over a trial, especially on assize, was different from 
hearing a case en banc in Westminster. Sitting en banc, de 
Grey had the assistance of his brethren.202 Gould had more 
experience on the bench; Nares, the former serjeant, had spent 
a career practicing before Common Pleas; Blackstone had the 
authorities at his fingertips.203 And if the Chief was unsure 
about the law or the cases, he could adjourn the hearing until 
the judges had time to research and consider the issue.204 At 
assize trials, by contrast, de Grey sat alone. He had to make 
decisions immediately, in open court, before a jury, and in the 
face of aggressive and compelling arguments by counsel.205 He 
would often have to hear many cases in a row, had less time to 
prepare for them, and did so with access to fewer books.206 He 
could not carry a load of law books with him on the road, and 
provincial cities could not always provide the books a judge 
  
 202 Bernard v. Bishop of Winchester, (1774) Lofft 401, 415 (C.B.) (“Lord Chief 
Justice De Grey—I find, on conferring, we agree in opinion, and will give no further 
trouble, though we are always glad to hear you.” (second emphasis added)); Tyssen v. 
Clarke, (1774) 3 Wils. 541, 548-50 (K.B.) (trial at bar, heard en banc, all four judges 
giving opinion on objection regarding admissibility of evidence). 
 203 See supra note 89. 
 204 See, e.g., Parsons v. Lloyd, (1772), Manuscript Reports, Lincoln’s Inn 
Library, Hill MS 15, fol. 30 (“Serj[ean]t Glynn not ready in his Cases so Per Curiam: It 
requires looking into the Cases.”). 
 205 See, e.g., THE WHOLE PROCEEDINGS IN THE CAUSE ON THE ACTION 
BROUGHT BY THE RT. HON. GEO. ONSLOW, ESQ. AGAINST THE REV. MR. HORNE 31-41 
(best evidence rule), 43-48 (variance in declaration) (Joseph Gurney ed., London, T. 
Davies & J. Gurney 1770) (recording the aggressive arguments made by counsel to 
Blackstone, J. in Onslow v. Horne, heard at the lent assize in 1770).  
 206 In Westminster, judges were supposed to receive papers from counsel 
containing the pleadings in the case several days before it was heard. 1 ROBERT 
RICHARDSON, THE ATTORNEY’S PRACTICE IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 190, 192, 
201-02 (London, J. Worrall 1769) (attorneys must deliver copies of the issue or 
demurrer book to the judges several days in advance of the hearing). The issue book 
consisted of the pleadings, procedural history, and any jury verdict. STEPHEN, supra 
note 69, at 103-04; see also 1 SYLVESTER DOUGLAS, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND 
DETERMINED IN THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH IN THE NINETEENTH, TWENTIETH, AND 
TWENTY-FIRST YEARS OF THE REIGN OF GEORGE III, at xii (London, T. Cadell & E. 
Brooke, 2d ed., 1786) (mentioning briefs of counsel). On assize, the judge presumably 
also received the pleadings in advance, but it is unclear how much in advance. See the 
letter of William Blackstone to Lady Blackstone, (Mar. 29, 1775) in THE LETTERS OF 
SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 123, at 151 (“I have 20 Causes at this place, 
none of them of considerable Length. Three are tried already, & the rest will be 
finished with Ease on Friday Morning, or perhaps Thursday Night.”). 
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might require.207 What de Grey needed was a compact reference 
book, an encyclopedia of nisi prius law. 
To turn Buller’s Nisi Prius into that encyclopedia, de 
Grey had to do some significant reengineering, and because 
only half of de Grey’s copy of the Nisi Prius is extant, 
reconstructing his steps takes some guesswork. The 1772 
edition that de Grey bought consisted of an unbound 330-page 
text, plus some front matter and an index.208 Although the book 
was usually bound as a single volume, one of the first things de 
Grey did was to separate the pages into two volumes of 
unequal size.209 The second volume has not been located and 
may be lost; nonetheless, the division can be reconstructed 
from a table of contents to both volumes that de Grey wrote on 
the inside front cover of volume one and a separate index he 
created covering both volumes.210 These sources suggest that 
volume one primarily, though not completely, covered 
substantive law, while evidence and procedure ended up in 
volume two.211 
  
 207 See, e.g., Trial Report, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Dampier MS, Buller Bundle 
51, at 2 (unnumbered) (Blackstone, J. relating in one trial report that he “in vain sent 
all round East Grinstead for an Edition of ye Statutes, which had in it the Book of 
Rates with the Rules thereunto annexed.”); see also PUB. ADVERTISER, Feb. 29, 1776, at 
2 (judges at criminal trial in London calling for statute books and reading them prior to 
commencing the case). 
 208 The booksellers were advertising the book “in sheets,” meaning unbound. 
In addition, the dimensions of de Grey’s copy (11” (27.8 cm) x 8.5” (21.6 cm)), roughly 
similar to copies in the British Library and Middle Temple indicate that the book could 
not have been disbound and rebound, with the concomitant trimming. 
 209 What became volume one consists of pages 3-112, 125-92, 265-78, 299-306, 
311-12. Most of the remaining pages ended up in volume two. The divisions did not 
always occur along part or chapter lines, one result being that pages on occasion break 
off or start in the middle of a sentence. In addition, the front matter, the original index, 
and pages 1 and 2 are presumably missing entirely. De Grey evidently discarded any 
pages that had no value to him. He did not need the title page or the dedication, for 
example, and the table of contents was no longer relevant, as will be seen. The index 
was also rendered unnecessary after he wrote his own. The likely explanation is that 
de Grey wanted to trim the book as much as possible if he was going to carry it with 
him on assize. 
 210 Index to William de Grey’s Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/17. 
 211 The first volume includes all of part one, books one and two on injuries to 
the person and injuries to personal property, respectively. It also includes the first two 
chapters—on trespass and ejectment—of book three on injuries to real property. All of 
part two, on contract, is in volume one, as is all of part three on actions given by 
statute. The remaining sections in this volume come from two pockets carved out of 
pages otherwise found in volume two. These pockets shifted to volume one consist of 
pages 265-78 and 299-306. These include the material on notes and bills, Statute of 
Frauds, juries, pleas puis darreign continuance, and abatement by death. Volume two, 
by contrast, consisted of the old, mostly little used real property writs, the majority of 
the long chapter on evidence, and most of the miscellaneous chapters on procedural 
matters. De Grey’s reason for including the sections on bills and the Statute of Frauds 
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However, de Grey did not stop with reorganizing the 
Buller, because he also felt that the original book left out, or 
failed to cover adequately, several areas of law that he 
considered important.212 Sale of goods, for example, did not have 
its own section in the Buller, neither did nuisance, nor such 
procedural matters of importance to judges as special verdicts, 
nonsuit, and granting certificates of notice to the court in 
  
in volume one is easy to explain. Although the treatment of bills and notes occurs in 
the long chapter on evidence, the section itself is mostly substantive. Furthermore, it 
deals in part with contracts, a subject included in volume one, and mentions sale of 
goods, about which de Grey included manuscript pages in volume one. The bills and 
notes section also required several additional manuscript pages to hold all the 
annotations. For reasons discussed below, de Grey likely wanted all the manuscript 
additions to be in volume one. The two pages on the Statute of Frauds—not a separate 
section in the Buller—remained in volume one essentially by accident. The bills and 
notes section ended on the top of page 277, followed on the bottom of the page by the 
beginning of Statute of Frauds, and 278 is the verso of 277. By contrast, the pages on 
juries, pleas puis darreign continuance, and abatement by death have no obvious 
connection to volume one. They all focus on procedural matters and none has a great 
deal of marginalia. 
  Furthermore, retaining these pages in volume one forced de Grey to split 
two gatherings, thereby orphaning pages in both volumes. Understanding this requires 
an explanation of bookbinding techniques. Each page, or leaf, of a book, consisting of a 
front and back (or recto and verso), is a folio. However, eighteenth-century books were 
not composed of a stack of folia. Each page was in fact a double page—a bifolium—
consisting of four text pages. The bifolia were folded and nested together to form a 
gathering, and the gatherings stacked to form the volume. In de Grey’s Nisi Prius, each 
gathering had two bifolia, and the whole book consisted of forty-eight gatherings. To 
give a concrete example, pages 1 to 8 made up the second gathering. The first 
bifolium—the outer part of the gathering—was page 1 (recto) and 2 (verso) and also 7 
(recto) and 8 (verso). The inside bifolium was page 3 (recto) and 4 (verso) and 5 (recto) 
and 6 (verso). If de Grey pulled out a single leaf, it would have to be cut off its bifolium 
partner, leaving a small tail in the margin. So, if de Grey removed page 1, page 8 would 
be orphaned, and in order to bind it in, a small piece of the inside margin of page 1 
would have to be left attached to page 8. Conversely, he might choose not to cut any 
pages but rather to remove an entire bifolium. If he removed the bifolium composing 
pages 3 to 6, for instance, the remaining pages would go: 1, 2, 7, 8. The last two pages 
of volume one, 311-12, deal with bills of exception, which de Grey’s table of contents 
lists in volume two though half the section is in volume one. These pages clearly ended 
up in volume one because they are part of the bifolium with pages 305-06. De Grey 
appears not to have cared much about them, since he wrote only one annotation on the 
two pages and since he split the chapter on bills of exception in half in order to keep 
311-12 in volume one, even though he had already divided the gathering of which they 
were a part. What is odd is that de Grey split gatherings in other parts of the book, so 
there would seem to be little reason not to do it with these two pages as well.  
 212 Evidence that de Grey was correct in believing that Buller’s treatment of 
some of these topics was inadequate, or, if nonexistent, that they were necessary 
additions can be found in ESPINASSE, supra note 199, at vii-viii, where he writes,  
it may, perhaps, be considered as a more serious objection, that several very 
material heads of the Law are totally omitted [from the Buller]. The Law of 
Policies of Insurance, a part of the Law of great extent and importance, is not 
touched on at all: The Law of Bills of Exchange and of Bankruptcy, very 
imperfectly. . . . 
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Westminster. De Grey’s response to these lacunae was to add 
pages, some consisting of his own handwritten notes, others 
coming perhaps from one or more printed sources. 
To the front of volume one, he appended blank pages on 
which he wrote his own entries on Servants’ Contracts,213 Sale 
of Goods, Special Verdict, What Maintains the Issue, Damage 
feasant, and Judge Certifying. At the end of the volume he 
wrote a half page on usury and eleven additional pages of 
overflow annotations from the book, in particular from the 
section on bills of exchange.214 The pages in front were marked 
A through M; the pages at the end were numbered 312a-312m, 
312 being the last printed page in this volume. 
In volume two, by contrast, de Grey added pages both at 
the end and in the middle of the book, and all pages were 
numbered, but the numbers were neither continuous with the 
Buller pages nor in numerical order. The additional entries in 
volume two are as follows: 
[Evidence] What the Best ....... 381, 378 
[Evidence] Copies of  ............... 375 
Demurr[e]r to Evidence  ......... 299215 
These additions fell in the middle of the volume, in the section 
on evidence, coming between what de Grey in the table of 
contents called “Evidence vivâ voce” at page 279 and “Bills of 
Exceptions” at page 309.216 At the end of the table the list 
continues: 
Witnesses not attend[in]g  ...... 385 
Plees, w[hi]ch tryed first  ........ 383 
  
 213 He did not list this page in the table of contents, perhaps because he 
viewed it as overflow from the text. However, the Nisi Prius does not have a section on 
master and servant, and the few scattered paragraphs to which de Grey cross-
referenced his extra page mention servants only in passing. By contrast, he separately 
lists the page on usury, even though he cross-references that page to a paragraph in 
the text, which also mentions usury only in passing. It may be that he wrote the page 
later, after the table of contents was made, though the writing shows no signs of the 
distortion that would have occurred if it had been done after binding. 
 214 Usury was at 312a, followed by overflow notes on malicious persecution 
(312b), false imprisonment (312c to 312e), rates (312f), trespass (312g), and bills and 
notes (312h to 312m). 
 215 The Buller contained a section on demurrer to evidence at page 307, which 
de Grey left out of his table of contents. 
 216 The Buller table of contents did not break up the content of the evidence 
chapter nor were there subheadings in the text. De Grey created his own subheadings. 
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[Insurance] Policies  ................ 347217 
General Issue  ......................... 113a 
Nonsuit &c. ............................. 365 
Commoners Pleedgs [sic] &c.  . 332 
Nuisance  ................................. 357 
Insolvent Debtor  .................... 380 363 
Customs proved  ...................... 335 
Copyhold  ................................. 113u 
Customs & Prescriptions  ....... 373 
Commons  ................................ 368 
He also moved the Nisi Prius pages 253-264 (fraudulent 
conveyances, wills of land, and stamps) out of order, extracting 
them from the general discussion of evidence and sandwiching 
them as a group between the last section of the book, on costs, 
and the new material on witnesses not attending. The fact that 
the pages in the second volume were in part arranged with no 
semblance of numerical order apparently did not hinder de 
Grey in using the book. 
Without the second volume and without being able to 
identify the source or sources of the extra material, which has 
thus far proven elusive, it is not possible to demonstrate 
conclusively how de Grey rebuilt his Nisi Prius. However, the 
evidence that does exist suggests that he did what a modern 
judge might do. He inserted his own notes in some places and 
used the eighteenth-century equivalent of photocopying pages 
from treatises in others.218 
The handwritten additional pages in volume one 
probably came from de Grey’s commonplace books. Nearly 
every individual note is attributed to one or more reports, just 
as they would be in a commonplace book. In volume two, pages 
113a and 113u, resembling in their numbering the handwritten 
pages in the back of volume one, suggest that de Grey might 
have used notes he had written at the end of another book. 
  
 217 The Buller table of contents just reads “Policies,” but de Grey’s index 
makes it clear that this refers to insurance. Index to William de Grey’s Nisi Prius, 
Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17, fol. 398; see also supra note 212. 
 218 Cf. BAKER & TAUSSIG, supra note 94, at 104 (ms. 270: printed attorney’s 
manual bound with manuscript notes). 
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These he may have cut out and inserted into the Nisi Prius, or 
he may have recopied them, maintaining the original page 
numbering so that he could find the originals easily in the book 
from which they came.219 
By contrast, it seems rather doubtful that the remaining 
extra material came from de Grey’s notebooks. His equity 
notebooks, his bench notebook from 1775-76, and his Nisi Prius 
index suggest that he preferred relatively small, top-bound 
lawyers’ notebooks.220 The Buller, by contrast, was a large folio 
measuring 11” (27.8 cm) x 8.5” (21.6 cm). Not only would the 
notebook pages have been significantly smaller, but they would 
have had little marginal space for rebinding, and, because they 
were top-bound, the writing on the back of each page would 
have been upside-down if bound into the Buller along the side 
margin. If de Grey had recopied the pages onto larger sheets, it 
would have made little sense to retain the original page 
numbering, because the size differential of the pages would 
have meant that the pagination would quickly cease to 
correspond. Furthermore, in volume one of the Buller, de Grey 
numbered his additional manuscript pages consecutively, and 
it is unclear why he would have chosen an inconsistent system 
for volume two. 
The logical explanation for the odd page numbering is 
that the pages came already numbered, presumably meaning 
they were pages from printed books.221 Although this raises the 
question whether de Grey would have bought new copies to 
  
 219 De Grey’s index indicates that these sections consisted of multiple pages. 
“Copyhold,” for instance, had at least four: 113u, 113w, 113x, and 113y. Index to 
William de Grey's Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/17, fols. 41-42. The index 
lists only three pages for “General Issue”: 113c, 113d, 113e. Id. fol. 80. 
 220 Index to William de Grey's Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/17 
(index); William de Grey Equity Notebooks, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Misc. MS 178, 179, 
180, 181, 182; William de Grey Bench Notebook, Lincoln’s Inn Library, Misc. MS 183. 
 221 It is technically possible, given the page numbers listed in his Index, that 
de Grey took all of the material from a single book. If so, then he reorganized them 
entirely, as the table of contents demonstrates. Index to William de Grey's Nisi Prius, 
Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17. To give one example, the Index entry for 
“Commoner[s],” contains references to pages 368-72 and 332-34. Id. De Grey’s table of 
contents lists Commoners Pledges beginning at page 332, followed by some intervening 
material by Customs Proved at 335, Customs & Prescriptions at 373, and Commoners 
at 368. If his Index lists the contents of pages 332-34 under the same heading as the 
contents of pages 368-72, it is not clear why de Grey would have kept them apart in the 
book when he was already reordering the pages such that page 373 came before pages 
368-72, and page 335 was separated from pages 332-34 by page 357 and page 380. 
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take apart or cut pages out of existing books,222 the fact that the 
pages of the other books would likely not correspond in size to 
the Buller might explain why so much substantive law—
insurance policies, commoners, nuisance, etc.—ended up in the 
volume dominated by procedure.223 Rather than have both 
volumes be ungainly, de Grey may have wanted to put all the 
odd-sized pages in one place. 
However, after arranging his volumes and adding quite 
a few additional pages, de Grey was only part way finished 
with his reconstruction project. His next step was to annotate 
the books. This he did in two steps. First he went through the 
Buller and made signposting annotations in the inner margin.224 
(See the picture of page 265 of de Grey’s book reproduced on 
the following page.) He numbered the main points on each 
page, starting from the top, and often wrote very brief 
descriptions summarizing the issue covered by each point. On 
some pages, he added additional text in the bottom margin, to 
which he also assigned numbers following in order on the 
marginal numbers he had placed next to the printed text. 
These signposting annotations permitted de Grey to make 
cross-referencing notes throughout the volume that pointed 
him not only to a particular page but also to a paragraph or 
even a sentence on that page.225 
Nevertheless, if the signposting marginalia made the 
book easier for de Grey to navigate, they did not fill the gaps he 
found in the Buller. Consequently, on nearly every page, he 
made extensive annotations, sometimes filling the margins and 
even flowing over onto the following page and onto the pages 
added at the end of the book. These notes provide a window 
into the sorts of information de Grey felt that he needed to 
have when preparing for trials. 
  
 222 Neither seems terribly likely, especially given that de Grey was something 
of a bibliophile. This might argue that the source of the extra material was a single 
book. 
 223 De Grey’s edition of Comyn’s Digest, for example, was a much larger work 
than the Buller; whereas his Tryals per pais—a precursor to the Buller—was a far 
smaller volume. The law library catalogue, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/4/1, lists the 
Comyns under folio (fol. 1), as does the English Short Title Catalogue, citation number 
T140618, and the Tryals per pais under octavo (fol. 8), as does the English Short Title 
Catalogue, citation number T121428. 
 224 These annotations clearly preceded the other notes, because de Grey had to 
write his longer notes around them. Among the evidence that de Grey actually read the 
book fairly carefully are the corrections he makes throughout to typographical errors. 
 225 Thus, a note such as the one found at the very bottom of the illustration on 
the next page that reads “v. 267.4” meant, “see page 267, point 4.” William de Grey's 
Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17. 
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The disjointed mélange of substantive rules, 
instructions on proper pleading, and strings of case squibs in 
Buller’s Nisi Prius offered the lawyer a checklist of sorts. If his 
client had been accused of conversion, for instance, the Nisi 
Prius explained what evidence had to be proved, beginning 
with the general reminder that “it must be known how the 
Goods came to his Hands,” then proceeding through a series of 
specific scenarios relating to refusal to return a good: a carrier’s 
failing to deliver, an inn-keeper retaining possession of a 
guest’s horse, an attorney’s refusing to turn over a document, 
and so on.226 
 
De Grey’s Annotations in his Nisi Prius. Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/18, 
428X4. Reprinted by courtesy of the Norfolk Record Office, Norwich, England. 
  
 226 Id. at 44-45. 
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To this material, de Grey added notes that 
supplemented, explained, and even occasionally questioned the 
text, and in so doing readied himself to perform the primary 
tasks of a trial judge: instructing the jury and making decisions 
on motions. This required him to know the law in detail, of 
course, and to be able to call up the signature cases, but 
perhaps even more importantly, he had to be prepared to 
address and parry counsels’ arguments, and he had to have 
sufficient depth and breadth of knowledge such that he could 
deal with unusual cases and explain his decisions in a manner 
that sounded authoritative and convincing. He used different 
sorts of marginal notations to meet these needs. 
Most of the annotations elucidated the law in greater 
detail than did the Nisi Prius, providing the more obscure 
exception or paraphrasing another case on a slightly narrower 
point. So, for example, the text discussing the special right of 
an innkeeper to refuse to hand over a horse until his feed had 
been paid for gave rise to this marginal comment: 
[A]n innkeeper cannot by law sell a horse for his feed except in 
London and Exeter, and there by custom the innkeeper may call 4 
neighbours and value the horse and meat, and if the meat is worth 
the horse, the property is changed and he may sell.227 
In an interlinear note on the same text, de Grey also observed, 
“nor can a stable keeper retain because not obliged to take 
in.”228 
His annotations could grow quite long. To the text 
addressing the husband’s liability for the debts of his wife due 
to the “Credit the Law gives her by Implication in Respect of 
Cohabitation,” de Grey added, 
even during cohabitation they should be proper for her rank and by 
Holt, where she bought fine Clothes, unknown to Husband, and left 
them at a Friend’s house, and dressed and undressed there and went 
into public and visited, Husband not liable. 1. Never came to his use. 
2. Secrecy takes away presumption of consent. Contra, if he had seen 
her in them. 3. Not necessary apparel. He is liable during his life for 
her debts contracted before coverture. If she is used to trade by 
herself, and takes up goods, he is liable because cohabitation. If he 
declares his dissent, so that it came to the knowledge of the 
tradesman or his servant, Husband not liable. She must be content 
  
 227 Id. at 45 marginal note a. The actual text of the note reads: “an Innkeeper 
cannot by Law sell a Horse for His Feed Salk 388 except in London & Exeter, & there 
by Custom the Innkeeper may call 4 Neighbours & value the Horse & meat & If the 
meat is worth the Horse, the Property is changed & He may sell.” 
 228 Id. at 45 interlinear note at end of carry-over paragraph. 
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with what he provides her or apply to Spiritual Court. If she takes 
up silks and pawns them, Husband is not answerable because they 
did not come to his use.229 
With such notes, de Grey readied a checklist so that he would 
have at hand the factors he might have to list for a jury or upon 
which he could base a decision. 
He displayed a similar interest in thoroughness in 
reacting directly to Buller’s case summaries. Where de Grey 
thought that Buller had described a case inadequately, he 
would fill in additional facts,230 and where he felt that the Nisi 
Prius’s treatment of a subject was incomplete, he would add 
more cases. In the discussion of defamation, for instance, he 
added several more case squibs, including one about King v. 
Newport, heard during Hilary Term 1728 by the Chief Justice 
of King’s Bench, Lord Robert Raymond, at a trial held in the 
Guildhall in London. In that case, de Grey wrote, an 
information was brought “for publishing a libel called ‘the Post 
Boy’ in which was contained a paragraph reflecting on A. It is 
not sufficient to prove that Defendant ordered that paragraph 
  
 229 Id. at 132 marginal note c. The note reads,  
even during Cohabitation They shd be proper for Her rank and by Holt, where 
She bought fine Cloaths, unknown to Husbd, & left em at a Friends house, & 
dresst and undresst there & went into pub. & visited, Hus. not liable 1. never 
came to his use. 2. Secrecy takes away Presumption of consent. Contra, if He 
had seen Her in Them. 3. not necessary apparel. He is liable during His L for 
her debts contracted bef. coverture. 3. W. 411. If she is used to trade by 
Herself, & takes up Goods, He is liable bec. Cohabit. Holt. Salk. 113. If he 
declares his dissent, so yt it came to the Knowledge of the Tradesman or His 
Servt., H. not liable. She must be content wth wt. he provides Her or apply to 
Spirl Ct. Ld R 1006. If She takes up Silks & pawns them, H. is not answerable 
bec. they did not come to His use. do & Salk 118.  
  For a similar example, see id. at 266 marginal note o:  
There are 3 sorts of Protests. 1. When party can’t be found. 2. refusg to accept. 
3. refusg to pay—protest proves itself. A Protest of a Foreign Bill is part of the 
Constitutn of the Custom enabling the Payee to recover agst. Drawer. Ld R. 
993[,] Salk 131. If He has protested for non-acc. He may tender the bill for 
paymt. when the time comes; & then He protests for non-paymt. V. J. Strange 
Can. 39 on the first He sends the Protest on the Last, the Protest (& Bill. Q. 
this i[s] bec. of recovery agst Drawer). 
 230 For instance, see id. at 28 interlinear note to Buller’s description of 
Woolston v. Scott (1753), about proof of marriage even by non-Anglicans, where de Grey 
wrote, 
& This was an Anabaptist; & not in the Church nor by the Church Service; & 
not being a Qn to be certifyed by the Bp. but actn agst a wrongdoer Denison J. 
was so clear  He wd. not suffer it to be debated but sd they might move for a 
new Trial, wch they did  not do. tho’ dam were 500L. 
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to be inserted, it being a charge for publishing the whole Post 
Boy.”231 
Although the Nisi Prius focused on cases, it also 
provided some model forms. In such instances, de Grey used 
his annotations to offer alternative phrasing, presumably to 
remind himself what changes would not vitiate the form. As 
part of a form for a bill of exception asking that a case be heard 
en banc, Buller provided the instruction, “(So set out the 
Evidence on both Sides, and then proceed as follows) 
‘Whereupon the said Council for the said Defendants, did then 
and there insist . . . ,’”232 to which de Grey added, “or ‘P offered 
to give in evidence,’ or ‘Defendant’ or either party ‘insisted that 
such evidence ought not to have been admitted,’ or ‘desired the 
Judge to inform the Jurors or declare to them the Law to be’ 
etc.”233 
Although most annotations provided additional law or 
cases to supplement the text of the Buller, de Grey also 
extended his own thinking into analogous matters. In one note 
he wrote, “In contracts, action by sole Plaintiff, Defendant may 
prove Plaintiff a partner with other. Contra in tort; must plead 
it. If Plaintiff should recover for half the wrong, it would 
discharge the whole.”234 In another annotation he explained, “a 
plea that A was bankrupt within the several acts is enough 
without saying how. Contra of simonist to show some act that 
brings them within the statute because it does not mention the 
word simony.”235 
A number of de Grey’s notes pertained to judges and 
judging. He was quite interested in the doctrinal disputes of his 
  
 231 Id. at 5 marginal note 4. The note reads, 
but in Informatn for publishg a Libell called “the Post Boy” in whch was 
contain’d a Paragraph reflecting on A. it is not sufficient to prove yt D. order’d 
That Paragraph to be Inserted, it being a Charge for publishg the whole Post 
boy. Kg & Newport. H. 13. G. 1. G.H. Raymd. C.J. 
 232 Id. at 312. 
 233 Id. at 312 marginal note s. The note reads, “or ‘P. offer’d to give in Evid.’ or 
‘Def’ or Either Party ‘Insisted that such Evid. ought not to have been admitted’ or 
‘desired the Judge to inform the Jurors or declare to them the Law to be’ &c.” 
Regarding the word “evidence” in the text, de Grey noted, at note m, “all the Evidence, 
& not That only on wch. the Qn. arises.” Id. at 312 marginal note m. 
 234 Id. at 149 marginal note m. The note reads, “In Contracts, actn by Sole P. 
D. may prove P. a Partner wth othr Contra in Torts must plead it. If P. shd. recover for 
half the wrong it wd disch. ye whole v. Salk. 440 290 2 Lev. 56, 112. 2 Mod 82. 3 K 39.” 
 235 Id. at 43 marginal note s. The note reads, “a Plea yt A was a Bankt. within 
the Sevl acts is eno’ wt. sayg How—Contra of Simonist to shew some act yt brings Him 
within ye Stat. bec. it does not mention the word Simony. Comb. 108.” 
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predecessors, in particular the renowned judges of the early 
and mid-eighteenth century. Perhaps so that he would know 
where the pitfalls lay, he devoted many annotations to a review 
of these disagreements. To give a brief example, though these 
sorts of notes were often quite long, regarding a text about set-
off in the context of a bankruptcy, he wrote, “Eyre C.J. held 
Defendant could not set off against assignees, a debt due to him 
from bankrupt. Afterwards Willes, C.J. doubted on such point 
and gave no opinion.”236 
Just as de Grey was interested in what other judges had 
decided and thought in specific cases, he also provided himself 
with reminders of things he needed to keep in mind when he 
was on the bench. With regard to a jury viewing a crime scene, 
he wrote, “The Judge at Nisi Prius may direct it. If 3 attend at 
the View, or if 6, and 3 at the Trial, it is Sufficient. They may 
inform the rest. The Court may compel attendance by amercing 
absentees for a contempt.”237 In another place, where Buller 
stated that it was at the discretion of the judge whether to hear 
a plea from defendant that some new evidence had arisen after 
the issue was joined but before trial,238 de Grey noted that, “it 
may be tried perhaps so far as to enable the judge to see 
whether he ought to accept or reject it, not to join issue on it.”239 
Finally, de Grey did not limit himself to strictly legal 
observations. His marginalia also contain the occasional bits of 
history, background explanation, and color. Annotating a 
discussion of the length of time after her husband’s death that 
a woman was considered to have given birth to a legitimate 
child, he wrote, citing a work on civil law, “9 months & 10 days, 
30 days [per] month solar, not lunar; may be a perfect birth at 
7. May go 10 or more—at Wittenburg one held legitimate in 
  
 236 Id. at 177 marginal note at the top of the page. The note reads, “Eyre C.J. 
held Deft. cd not set off agst assignees, a debt due to Him from Bt. afterwds Willes. C. J. 
doubted on such point & gave no opinion.” 
 237 Id. at 300 note m. The note reads, 
The Judge at ni: Pri: may direct it—If 3 attend at the View or if 6, & 3 at the 
Trial, it is Suffict they may Inform the rest. the Ct. may compel attendance by 
amercg absentees for a Contempt. Ld Hard. In Dn. of Ely & Sr. J. Stuart. 5 
June 1746. 
 238 Id. at 95. 
 239 Id. at 95 note w. The note reads, “1 Sid. 238 says it may be tried Perhaps 
so far as to enable the Judge to see Wr He ought to accept or reject it. not to join Issue 
on it.” 
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11th month; at Paris, 14 months after.”240 When Buller 
discussed the origin of trials at nisi prius, de Grey added, 
“Circuits first erected into 6 by Henry 2, A.D. 1179, 3 Judges to 
each,” and cited Paul Rapin de Thoyras’ History of England, a 
work he owned.241 At the beginning of the chapter on trover, de 
Grey explained, “it is an action on the right. Trespass on 
possession; it was introduced instead of detinue to avoid wager 
of law; and of trespass to avoid the necessity of pleading 
specially. Yet it is founded on tort, and sounds in trespass.”242 
The marginalia show that de Grey sought to have at his 
fingertips the various types of information that would help him 
decide questions of law, give explanations to juries, and engage 
with counsel. He put into his notes not just the rules and 
checklists, but also summaries of judges’ discussions, 
conflicting opinions, pointers to analogous concepts, and bits 
and pieces of background material that would prepare him to 
address all the angles and arguments that might arise. 
According to his accounts, de Grey completed the 
restructuring and annotation of the Buller over the course of at 
most two weeks during early December 1772.243 Under those 
  
 240 Id. at 112 marginal note o. The note reads, “9 mo. & 10 days. 30 days to 
mo. solar. not lunar. may be a Perfect birth at 7.—may go 10. or more—at Wittenburgh 
one held legitimate in 11th mo.—at Paris, 14 mo. after. v. Redley’s Civil Law. 55.” 
 241 Id. at 299 note m, which reads, “Circuits first erected into 6. by Hen. 2. 
A.D. 1179. 3 Judges to Each 1 Rapin 239.” The Rapin is listed in a 1732 edition in his 
home library, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/4/2, fol. 5. If de Grey was using the 1732 
edition, however, he got the page number wrong. The correct page was 276, and the 
year Rapin referred to was 1176. Similarly, on page 180 at marginal note c, to the text 
“the Hundred within which any Robbery is committed shall be answerable for the 
same,” William de Grey's Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17 ,de Grey wrote: 
“a neighbor by 1 Rapin 151 means ‘near pledge’ or ‘Burghs’ 10 families composing one, 
& the Heads pledging for Each other—Qui est in Eadem vice. but in West 2. extending 
Stat. Merton to neighbors & neighbor means all in adjoining Towns. 2 Ins 474 . . . .” Id. 
at 180 marginal note c. The correct page in the 1732 edition was 179, and the Rapin 
text speaks of a “near security” rather than a “near pledge.” 
 242 Id. at 32 note d, which reads, “it is an actn. on the right. Trespass on Possn. 
it was introduced instead of detinue to avoid wager of Law; & of Trespass, to avoid the 
necessity of pleading specially. yet it is founded on Tort, & sounds in Trespass.” 
 243 According to his accounts, he bought the book in December 1772, though 
the account does not indicate when in the month he made the purchase, and it could 
be, perhaps, that the book had been purchased somewhat earlier. Accounts of William 
de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/10/43. The archives also contain a receipt from 
a bookbinder that reads, “Rec’d Dec[embe]r 16. 1772 Of the Rt. Hon. Lord Grey the 
Sum of Nine Shillings for binding two vols. of Nisi Prius in Vellum . . . .” Record of 
Payment, Binding of Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/11/43. The same 
receipt indicates that two days later de Grey paid an additional 2 shillings sixpence for 
unspecified alterations. Id. The total price of 11 s. 6 d. for binding in vellum is odd. By 
comparison, de Grey paid 7 s. to have two large folio volumes of the Journals of the 
House of Commons half-bound in leather in April 1772. Record of Payment, Binding of 
Journals of the House of Commons, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/10/3. Based on the 
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circumstances, it comes as no surprise that his annotations do 
not appear to represent new research. Most of the authorities 
cited in the annotations came ultimately out of sixteenth-, 
seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century reporters. When de 
Grey cited unreported cases and attributed them to a specific 
judge, the judges mentioned most frequently were those, 
current and recently past, of greatest prominence when he was 
a student and young barrister in the late 1730s and 1740s.244 
Citations to cases and to the judges serving during the years of 
his mature practice were very rare. Despite Mansfield’s 
importance to the jurisprudential development of the time, he 
was never mentioned by name, and only one case was cited 
from Burrow’s reports of Mansfield’s opinions.245 De Grey’s 
predecessor on Common Pleas, John Eardley Wilmot, merited 
only two mentions,246 and de Grey made only three references to 
cases decided during his own first two years on the Court.247 
Furthermore, he did not continue to update the Nisi Prius with 
new law made while he was on the bench.248 Apparently, he 
intended his copy of the Buller exclusively as a storage place 
for older precedents. Very likely he used separate bench 
notebooks to record new material.249 
Given the speed with which the book was compiled, the 
best explanation for the choice of sources is that he copied from 
predigested material and did not, except perhaps in rare 
instances, return to the original reporters to cull material for 
  
fact that the marginalia show no sign of the distortion that would have occurred had he 
done them after binding, he must have completed the annotations prior to this date. 
 244 These include most prominently, John Holt (Chief Justice of King’s Bench 
1689-1710), Robert Raymond (Chief Justice of King’s Bench 1725-1733), Lord 
Hardwicke (Chief Justice of King’s Bench 1733-1737, Chancellor 1737-1756), William 
Lee (Chief Justice of King’s Bench 1737-1754), Robert Eyre (justice on King’s Bench 
1710-1723, Chief Baron of the Exchequer 1723-1725, Chief Justice of Common Pleas 
1725-1735), and John Willes (Chief Justice of Common Pleas 1737-1761). 
 245 William de Grey's Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17, at 86 
marginal note c. 
 246 Id. at 88 marginal note a, 103 marginal note c. 
 247 Id. at 5 marginal note 4, 103 marginal note c. Both have references to 1772 
cases before Common Pleas. See id. at 274 marginal note m for a reference to a 
Common Pleas case from 1771. 
 248 For instance, he decided a case in 1776 that was exactly on point with 
notes he made on page 133 of the Buller concerning elopement, yet he did not add a 
citation to the later case. Hatchett v. Baddeley, (1776) 2 W. Bl. 1079, 1080-82; Inner 
Temple MS 97, fols. 132, 133-39, 140-41. 
 249 We know, for instance, that he kept a bench notebook when sitting at 
Westminster. The one from 1775-76 is extant, and it mentions other notebooks, e.g., 
William de Grey Bench Notebook, Lincoln’s Inn Library, MS. 183, fol. 2r (“v. my 
notes”); id. fol. 4v (“v. 1st argt. from vol: 97 & Popes Book.”). 
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his annotations. While he could have copied from someone 
else’s annotated Nisi Prius, certain stylistic similarities with 
the method of annotation in his equity notebooks tend to argue 
against this.250 Instead, a quirk in the form of the marginalia 
suggests the hypothesis that de Grey created the notes by 
searching his own commonplace books for relevant cases and 
observations. This quirk is that he used only thirteen letters (a, 
b, c, d, h, k, m, n, o, s, w, x, and z) to key the text to the 
marginalia. For example, an “a” written above a word in the 
text led him to a note in the margin marked with an “a.”251 
The letters did not correspond to placement on the page. 
He made no obvious attempt to use the letters in order from top 
to bottom, nor did he always use certain letters in the top, 
middle, or bottom quadrants of the page. Furthermore, he 
occasionally used the same letter multiple times on a single 
page, corresponding to different annotations.252 It is likely, 
therefore, that each letter referred to a specific source, and 
given the fact that the notes corresponding to a certain letter 
do not come from the same book—for instance, the “m” notes 
refer to cases from many different reporters—and that no other 
published book covered the same material as the Buller, it is 
rather unlikely that de Grey was using printed material.253 
A more plausible hypothesis is that de Grey used his 
own notebooks and commonplace books. If so, he worked 
something like this. He began by pulling only the thirteen 
notebooks that contained relevant material. The notebooks 
were likely labeled with letters.254 For each topic in the Buller, 
  
 250 He also uses the first person on occasion. See, e.g., William de Grey's Nisi 
Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17, at 66 marginal note c (“I always do it.”); id. 
at 189 interlinear note after last line (“I suppose not liable to penalty.”). 
 251 Of these, a, c, m, and s were by far the most common. The letters b, d, k, n, 
o, x, w, and z were infrequently used. The letter z was used only once; x four times; d 
five times; n seven times; o eleven times; b twelve times; w fifteen times; k sixteen 
times. 
 252 For example, m is used three times in the text on page 88, keyed to two 
different notes, see id. at 88, or where m and o are both used twice, keyed to different 
notes. See id. at 274. 
 253 Of course, the choice could simply be random. That is, de Grey liked using 
these particular letters, perhaps because he felt they were distinct and would not be 
confused with other letters. But if the letters were indeed chosen at random, one might 
expect a more random distribution. And yet, certain letters predominate throughout 
the book, and other letters are used in fits and starts. In the first 125 pages of de 
Grey’s copy of the Nisi Prius, for example, “o” appears only on pages 5 and 112, and “n” 
shows up on pages 13, 33, and 89. In the same range, “m” appears on almost every page 
that has annotations. 
 254 See, e.g., the eighteenth-century notebooks of Charles Fearne at the Middle 
Temple library, labeled on the spine with letters. 
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he looked through the notebooks, starting generally with the 
one corresponding to the letter “a,” because the “a” annotation 
was usually placed in the top margin.255 He may normally have 
ended with the notebooks “s” and “w,” because those notes were 
often written in the bottom margin. 
If de Grey were indeed using his own notebooks, it 
would not be at all exceptional to find that most of the citations 
came from reporters and judges prominent in the 1730s and 
1740s when he was a young barrister building up his personal 
library of legal reference material.256 Increasing the likelihood 
that this was how de Grey worked are two other examples of 
judges using this sort of letter system to refer to their own 
notebooks. In his commonplace book, Sir Matthew Hale 
marked each entry with a letter code to denote the notebook 
from which he had taken the case he was abstracting.257 A 
similar system is apparent in a notebook of cases that might 
have been owned by Justice Gould or one of the justices of the 
Common Pleas who immediately preceded de Grey on the 
court.258 
The amount of work de Grey put into remaking his Nisi 
Prius suggests he placed a great deal of importance upon 
having a compact circuit reference book that gathered together 
all the relevant law previously recorded in a number of 
different notebooks. That such a reference could have been 
useful is demonstrated by a manuscript report of a trial for 
slander over which de Grey presided in London, recorded, 
ironically, in an anonymous lawyer’s copy of Buller’s Nisi 
Prius.259 “This was an Action for calling the Plt. a Sodomite & a 
Bugger[e]r,” began the report. The question was whether 
  
 255 One reason an “a” note might be displaced is because the top margin is 
already filled with a note carried over from the prior page. See, e.g., William de Grey's 
Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17, at 269. 
 256 The system could also explain why he evidently on occasion forgot to write 
the key letter at the beginning of a note and only added it above the annotation later, 
and why he sometimes did not place a key letter in the text of the Nisi Prius, even if he 
did write it in front of the annotation. If he were copying notes from another Buller, 
these sorts of omissions would be unlikely, since he would copy exactly what he saw. 
But if he had to go back and forth between notebooks, searching for, then copying or 
maybe only paraphrasing into the Nisi Prius what he had written in the notebook, he 
may easily have lost track of the letter of the source notebook or forgotten which word 
exactly had spurred him to make this notation. 
 257 2 J.H. BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL MANUSCRIPTS IN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA: A DESCRIPTIVE LIST 365-66 (1990). 
 258 BAKER & TAUSSIG, supra note 94, at 148 (ms. 381). 
 259 Id. at 80 (ms. 217) (the case, from the “Sittings after Mich[aelma]s Term” 
possibly 1778, is reported on the interleaved page between text pages 8-9). 
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defendant had a right to make such a comment because she 
was speaking to the plaintiff’s wife, her niece, and speaking out 
of concern. The Nisi Prius, and one of de Grey’s annotations, 
squarely addressed this legal issue in the chapter on slander.260 
The last question is whether de Grey actually used his 
bench book. The evidence is indirect because, notwithstanding 
the example just given, his nisi prius trials were rarely 
reported, and he did not update the book with new law. First, a 
bookmark remains in the book. It is a scrap of paper torn from 
a book auction catalogue that can be identified as dating to 
around February 1777,261 and the summer 1777 assize may 
have been the last time de Grey rode circuit.262 Second, a piece 
of paper is folded and tucked between pages 312d and 312e. It 
contains fragmentary notes on at least two different legal 
issues—lack of proof in an action for possession of real property 
by prescription and an action for a ship—neither of which 
correspond to marginalia in the book, and which could possibly 
be trial notes. Third, the Buller was not included in either of de 
Grey’s library catalogues, and it found its way into the archives 
with his papers. This suggests that it was a desk book, a book 
for use, and not a book for sitting on the shelf. 
Finally, there is de Grey’s index. The Buller came with 
an index, but de Grey ignored it and created a new one in a 
separate notebook. He relied neither on the headings in the 
Buller index nor on its list of topics under each heading but 
instead devised his own. The Buller index, for example, begins 
with: Abatement, Abuttals, Account, Actions, Administration, 
and Admittance, while the de Grey index begins: Almanacs, 
Abatements, Abstract, Attaint, Awards, Assets Real.263 Under 
  
 260 BULLER, supra note 197, at 10. 
 261 Bookmark Between Pages 162-63 in William de Grey’s Nisi Prius, Norfolk 
Record Office, WLS LV/17. The paper was torn from BENJAMIN WHITE, A CATALOGUE 
OF SEVERAL LIBRARIES LATELY PURCHASED, CONTAINING A VERY LARGE COLLECTION OF 
THE MOST VALUABLE BOOKS IN EVERY LANGUAGE AND CLASS OF LEARNING 219-20 (n.d.) 
(the catalogue indicates that “The Books will begin to be Sold on Thursday the 6th of 
February, 1777”). 
 262 According to his accounts, serjeants seem to have gone the circuit for him 
in the summers of 1778 and 1779. Accounts of William de Grey, Norfolk Record Office, 
WLS LV/15/5 (Sept. 22, 1778), WLS LV/16/18 (Dec. 23, 1779) (gratuities of £10 de Grey 
paid to Serjeant Foster and Serjeant Heath respectively in appreciation for their taking 
over his assize circuit during those summers). He was supposed to go on circuit with 
Blackstone in 1776 but did not because of an attack of the gout. PREST, supra note 156, 
at 261. De Grey generally appears to have skipped the lent assize, as did Chief Justice 
Mansfield. 1 OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 15, at 129. 
 263 Index to William de Grey's Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS LV/17, 
fol. 1 (unpaginated first page). 
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each heading, de Grey included anywhere from one to dozens of 
listings summarizing, in a manner similar to Buller, the point 
referenced. For instance, under “Lost Evidence” he wrote:264 
1. Postea, proved by associate 343.8. 
2. Verdict [proved] by his Notes ib. 9 
3. Circumst[antia]l Proof of orig[ina]l suffic[ien]t ib.9 
4. Record proved by a Copy 229.3265 
And the list continues for another two pages. All of this 
organizing and summarizing must have taken de Grey a quite 
substantial amount of time, and the index is entirely in his 
hand. He would have had little reason to do all this work 
unless he believed that he needed a means to access the 
information he had stored in his Nisi Prius. Furthermore, the 
index shows signs of a certain amount of updating. In 
particular, the last several pages of the notebook contain notes 
on customs officials deriving from cases heard en banc by 
Common Pleas between 1772 and 1777.266 These additional 
notes indicate that de Grey continued to make use of the index, 
and the index would have been useless without his 
reconstructed Buller volumes nearby. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The fortuitous preservation in the de Grey archives of 
traces of his approach to his own judicial education cracks open 
a tiny window into this mysterious rite of passage that judges 
have undergone for centuries. In revering its judges, the 
  
 264 Id. at fol. 100. 
 265 The number represents the page number followed by de Grey’s own 
internal marginal numbering. 
 266 The first page and a half of notes follow the standard practice of the rest of 
the index, with each new entry being consecutively numbered and taking up one or two 
lines. But the remaining pages read more like bench notes, abstracting judges’ opinions 
from a case heard en banc; see also 1) a reference on fol. 32 in the section on Certificate 
of Judge to a case from 1778 (or 1775, the 8’s and 5’s on rare occasions can be difficult 
to tell apart), Index to William de Grey's Nisi Prius, Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17; 
2) the entry on fol. 33 [116] added at the end of the section on Criminal Conversation, 
reading: “Prostit[utio]n bef[ore] marr[iage] Ev[idence] to mitigate If Husb[and] knew it 
then. Ld Mansf[iel]d—If did not. Q[uery] by me.” Index to William de Grey's Nisi Prius, 
Norfolk Record Office, WLS/LV/17, fols. 32-33. De Grey and Mansfield obviously did 
not sit on the same court, and it seems unlikely that this entry referred to a case 
considered by the judges together in Serjeants’ Inn. But Mansfield and de Grey did ride 
circuit together during the Summer assize of 1777. 2 OLDHAM, MANSFIELD 
MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 15, at 1498. 
200 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1 
common law systems have been loath to acknowledge that they 
do not always, or even very often, come to the bench prepared 
to serve. And in desiring, perhaps, to preserve their aura of 
authority, judges, too, have been reluctant to admit to their 
own deficiencies. Fortunately, the recent era of the baby judge 
schools has seen a growing transparency about the need for 
judicial training.267 Such openness facilitates the study of 
judicial education, and the topic deserves more attention than 
it has received from either modern scholars or legal historians. 
If the sources from which judges learn their law affect the law 
they make, then uncovering and investigating those sources 
might provide significant insights into how and why the law 
developed as it has.268 
  
 267 On Becoming a Judge, supra note 2, at 144. 
 268 See, for example, observations that what judges learn at baby judges 
school later affects their judging in Arnold, supra note 13, at 771 (“[T]he impetus 
towards settlement is becoming the major theme, it seems to me, in classes that are 
held for new judges.”); William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, 
Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 79 n.74 (2006) (“[T]here are . . . 
pressures to keep you in line. In baby judge school, one trainer went so far as to begin a 
session on employment discrimination by saying, ‘here’s how you get rid of these 
cases!’” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
